IBTAHIDSCH Ensemble فرقة ابتهج

Karam Kasem (oud/Laute)
Leen Shaban (Violine und Gesang)
Aref Nadschib (buzuq/Langhalslaute und Gesang)
Hadi Andywi (Perkussion)
Claudia Ott (nay/Rohrflöte)

Das IBTAHIDSCH Ensemble entstand 2015 auf Initiative des ehemaligen Celler Superintendenten Dr. Hans-Georg Sundermann. Gründerin und Leiterin ist die im Landkreis Celle ansässige Arabistin und Chorleiterin Claudia Ott. Der Name IBTAHIDSCH entstammt einem arabischen Liederbuch aus der Tradition der protestantischen Schneller-Schulen im Heiligen Land. Die dort überlieferte Übersetzung des Weihnachtslieds "Fröhlich soll mein Herze springen" beginnt mit den Worten "ابتهج قلبي تغن Freue dich, mein Herz, und singe!"

IBTAHIDSCH Ensemble فرقة ابتهج

Karam Kasem (oud/Laute)
Leen Shaban (Violine und Gesang)
Aref Nadschib (buzuq/Langhalslaute und Gesang)
Hadi Andywi (Perkussion)
Claudia Ott (nay/Rohrflöte)

Link to Livestream: https://live.gwdg.de/play/DAVO

The history of Shiʿi jurisprudence and legal institutions is so often excluded from the contemporary academic study of Islamic law. This is true of all the Shiʿi groups: Twelver, Zaydi and Ismaʿili law hardly feature in general accounts of Islamic legal history. Twelver Shiʿi legal authority – my focus in this talk – has perhaps faired better (primarily due to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but for most academics, Twelver Shiʿi discourse appears alien to those studying contemporary Islamic law; to many researchers, the texts of the Twelver Shiʿi jurists appear opaque and technical: the jurists seem to be talking to themselves, and are unconcern with any external audience. Little surprise then that many scholars simply ignore Shiʿi legal developments, and write histories of Islamic law as if they do not exist.

In this presentation, I explore the foundations of modern Twelver Shiʿi jurisprudence and the development of the complex legal system which has proved a bridge too far for many contemporary scholars. In the early 19th Century CE, the Twelver Shiʿi jurists of Iran and Iraq embarked on an intellectual path which would ultimately shape the legal theory of contemporary Shiʿism. Unlike many of their Sunni counterparts, they were not particularly concerned with European expansion; they showed little interest in how the structures of Islamic law might adapt to foreign (imperialist, Western) notions of law or morality until much later in the 19th century. Instead, the focus of most of them was primarily internal: extinguishing from Shiʿi legal thinking the deviant trend of Akhbarism and establishing (or, as they liked to style it “re-establishing”) the dominance of the Mujtahid class. Both Akhbaris and the Mujtahids accused their opponents of being under the influence of “Sunni” or “Ashʿari” ideas. Both claimed that they rejected Sunnism and were preserving the authentic Shiʿism (and by implication, authentic Islam); both claimed that Shiʿi law (as they understood it) was quite different from other versions of Islamic law, and in this difference lay its superiority. I will argue that their exclusionist claims of uniqueness do not mean their ideas were disconnected from the wider Islamic context. In fact, recognising the contribution to Islamic legal history of these early modern Shiʿi jurists not only enriches the field: it helps to cleanse our field any implicit sectarianism.

IBTAHIDSCH Ensemble فرقة ابتهج

Karam Kasem (oud/Laute)
Leen Shaban (Violine und Gesang)
Aref Nadschib (buzuq/Langhalslaute und Gesang)
Hadi Andywi (Perkussion)
Claudia Ott (nay/Rohrflöte)

This study describes the ironic and unintended cooperation between the United States of America (USA) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in rewriting a populist social contract in Egypt under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, with a focus on his economic and social welfare reform programmes. Since the PRC under Xi Jinping initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, President Sisi has been attempting to maintain a balance in his relationships with the USA and PRC by leveraging Egypt’s geopolitical advantages. He has actively accepted investment from the PRC, such as its contributions to the construction of Egypt’s new capital city, to achieve state-led economic growth, which is part of Sisi’s strategy to ensure the survival of his regime. Simultaneously, he is also struggling to reform social welfare policies with support from Washington-based international financial organisations, such as the World Bank. Heintroduced a smart card system for food subsidies and a new cash transfer programme that benefited from technical advice provided by the World Bank. These social welfare reforms are intended to concentrate the state’s resources for poverty alleviation, transforming the populist welfare system into a more neoliberal system. This reform is a part of Sisi’s attempt to enhance his regime’s durability with support from Washington-based international financial organisations. These phenomena ironically demonstrate that these two superpowers, the USA and PRC, have helped Sisi’s Egypt rewrite the populist ‘social contract’, which has promised generous welfare provisions to the people since the Naser regime. This is despite the fact that a conflict between the two superpowers is currently intensifying in the region, with Egypt becoming a new ‘battlefront’ in this conflict.

Politicians believe that globalization of economy has, in recent decades, changed territorial spaces of countries in such a way that if you travel from one point in the world to another, you will encounter goods and brands produced and consumed at different places around the globe. Over the past few decades, the creation of transit corridors for transportation has gained significant economic and geopolitical importance, and corridors have had considerable impact on regional integration and development. For this reason, many countries have moved towards modern regionalism to expand and develop these corridors. One of these corridors is China's BRI project (executed worldwide). Additionally, the North-South Transit Corridor connects India to Chabahar Port, South Iran, to Anzali Port North Iran, and through the Caspian Sea to Northern Europe.
Furthermore, another corridor connects the Port of Salalah in Oman to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and ultimately to Europe. Another important geopolitical corridor will connect Southeast and South Asia to the Port of Faw and Basra in Iraq at the head of the Persian Gulf to Turkye’s Ankara, and Istanbul into Europe (excluding Iran). In this research, the authors have proposed a new transit corridor with emphasis on inclusion of all countries in the region from the Indian Ocean to the Black Sea. Connecting the Persian Gulf through via free trade-industrial zones of Jebel Ali, Arvand, and Maku to Trabzon on the Black Sea. The research method of the article is document descriptive-analytical and on-site field research. The study aims to develop regional integration through the construction of infrastructures with shared benefits among Middle Eastern countries.

Dr. Morteza Ghourchi (Ph.D.)
Rooholah Hosseini (Ph.D. Candidate)

Abstract:
In the 21st century, expanding relations with neighboring countries has been the predominant geopolitical strategy in Europe. It is seen as a venue for integration and sustainable peace. In fact, mutual relations with neighbors have predominated international policies at bilateral and multi-lateral levels with various political, economic and security approaches. One of these policies has been specifying a section of the mainland for trade or manufacturing to be excluded from regular laws and regulations, which would otherwise correspond to rules of national security, border control and tariffs, Today there are over 5,000 Free Trade Zones (FTZs) or Free Economic Zones (FEZs) around the world, with each zone offering various benefits such as tax incentives, streamlined customs procedures, and relaxed regulations to encourage international trade and investment. These zones are established by countries to attract foreign businesses and boost economic growth. At present we are experiencing what is known as 6th generation
FEZs which is characterized by multi-country agreements. Some of the best examples are those
established between [Singapore-Malasia-Indonesia] or [Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia] or in Mekong River Basin [China-Thailand-Myanmar-Laos-Vietnam-Cambodia].In the Middle East FTZs include Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone in the United Arab Emirates and the King Abdullah Economic City in Saudi Arabia.
While protecting national interests, exclusion of others and resulting confrontation has been the
mainstream of geopolitical thoughts during past several decades, we, in this, research adhere to the principles of 6th Gen. FTZs to establish multi-national free zones between [1- Iran-Bahrain-Kuwait-Iraq-Turkye] and [2- Iran-UAE-Oman-Qatar] and [3- Iraq-Syria-Jordan-Lebanon-Turkye]. We believe that this initiative increases mutual interests while reduces disqualifies, tensions and hostilities.

Der Beitrag behandelt speziell Fragen zu Recht und (Post-)Kolonialismus in British India und Pakistan. Er setzt sich zum Ziel, anhand einer Untersuchung der Bedeutung des Korans als ein von vielen Muslimen als heilig eingestuftes Objekt und dessen rechtlichen Schutzes, das Zusammenspiel kolonialer und post-kolonialer Rechtsordnungen darzustellen.
Ausgehend von anthropologischen, historischen und religionswissenschaftlichen Arbeiten der letzten 10 Jahren, die sich mit der Materialität des Korans in Bezug auf Gebräuche und religions-gemeinschafltliche Normen in Kenia, Ägypten und Tunesien auseinandergesetzt haben, möchte dieser Beitrag darlegen, wie im Laufe der letzten 70 Jahre erst in mehreren Provinzen im kolonialen Indien und seit 1973 auch in Pakistan, eine Serie von Gesetzen verabschiedet worden sind, die den Lebenszyklus des Korans als Objekt bildlich gesprochen von der Wiege bis zur Bahre begleiten. Beginnend mit der Verabschiedung des indischen Strafgesetzbuchs im Jahr 1860 im kolonialen Indien und endend mit den 2022 Gesetzesänderungen (amendments) des Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act von 2011, untersucht dieser Beitrag eine Rechtsentwicklung, die sich nicht nur mit dem Objekt, dem physischen Buch also, auseinandersetzt sondern auch mit seiner Übersetzung und Auslegung. Die britische Kolonialverwaltung hat den Koran eher widerwillig geschützt. Über die Jahre hat die pakistanische Rechtsordnung diesen Schutz jedoch sehr stark ausgebaut, bishin zum Erbauen von „Ruhestätten“ für alte oder zerlesene Koranbücher.
Obwohl das Thema des Schutzes des Korans in den letzten Jahren vor allem in den Medien durch Verbrennungen des Korans in Schweden und Dänemark einerseits, und Lynchjustiz durch aufgebrachte Mengen in Pakistan sehr präsent geworden ist, gibt es bislang keine wissenschaftliche Arbeit im europäischen Raum, die sich gezielt mit der Frage beschäftigt, wie der pakistanische Staat den Koran schützt, und welche Konsequenzen dieser Schutz für die Rechtsordnung und insbesondere Grundrechte von in Pakistan lebenden Muslimen and Nicht-Muslimen hat. Dies ist auch daran ersichtlich, dass die diesem Beitrag zugrundeliegenden
Primärquellen, wie zum Beispiel interne Korrespondenz der britischen Kolonialverwaltung, parlamentarische Debatten auf Länder- und Bundesebene, Gesetzesentwürfe, Gesetzestexte sowie Verordnungen, und Gerichtsurteilen, größtenteils bislang noch nie wissenschaftlich behandelt oder dargestellt worden sind.

In most Middle Eastern countries Christian communities apply their own family laws. By contrast, inheritance law is often not religiously divided and Christian and Muslim communities apply the Islamic inheritance law. In general, Sunni and Shiʿi law continues to uphold the concept of two shares for men and one share for women. Thus, Muslim and Christian women usually inherit half of the shares of men of the same degree. I show that Muslim and Christian women are affected by unequal inheritance shares as manifested in Islamic family law, but Christian women are at a greater disadvantage because of how religious affiliation and gender intersect in the context of family and inheritance law. Especially since the 2000s some Christian communities like in Syria have been issuing their own inheritance laws. The Protestant community in Palestine followed suit in 2017. In Egypt several court decisions have declared that Christians can apply their own family laws following a constitutional amendment of 2014. In Jordan, efforts to issue an inheritance law for all Christian communities in Jordan have intensified. In February 2018 a first codified draft inheritance law was elaborated. The law makes gender equality a primary principle and has introduced other important changes. However, the codification process of this first draft faces several challenges, and the future of the draft law remains unclear. I argue that efforts of Christian communities to apply their own inheritance laws have led to further pluralization of the legal system; in the process new types of equalities and inequalities emerged and societies have become further fragmented. The paper is based on an analysis of the various laws and draft laws as well as indepth interviews with church court judges, activists, and parliamentarians based in the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

Wenn man sich auf die Rolle der Richter in der vormodernen Zeit konzentriert und sich die Gerichtsfälle und Urteile anschaut, wird deutlich, dass die Richter das Gesetz praktisch und säkular anwendeten, unabhängig davon, was in den kanonisierten Fiqh-Handbüchern Rechtswissenschaft) geschrieben war. Manchmal wurden sogar die Theorien und Kanons aus den überlieferten Rechtshandbüchern deutlich missachtet. Richter nutzten ihren Ermessensspielraum und zeigten, dass die Rechtstheorie oft von der gelebten Realität getrennt war. Während sich die meisten akademischen Studien auf die Rechtsschulen konzentrieren, um sie zu vergleichen oder gegenüberzustellen und zu versuchen, die Geschichte ihrer Entwicklung aufzuklären, bleibt die praktische Seite des Rechts unzureichend erforscht. Es wird wenig darauf geachtet, welche Mittel die Richter anwendeten, um für oder gegen eine bestimmte Entscheidung zu argumentierten, und nicht danach gefragt, welche möglichen Gründe dieser Entscheidung zugrunde lagen.
Die hier diskutierten Fälle bieten neue Einblicke in die Diskrepanz zwischen der Formalität und Starrheit der geschriebenen theoretisch kanonisierten Rechtshandbücher und der säkularen gelebten Realität und stellen einige der wissenschaftlichen Schlussfolgerungen in Frage. Die in diesem Beitrag analysierten Fälle veranschaulichen die komplexe Beziehung zwischen der Rolle der Richter als Träger einer theoretischen religiösen Rechtsprechung und ihrer Rolle bei der Gestaltung der Rechtspraxis in der ägyptischen Gesellschaft.
Die ausgewählten Fälle konzentrieren sich auf Fällen von Frauen und Kindern, entweder als Kläger, Angeklagte oder als Gegenstand der Verhandlungen. Es wird argumentiert, dass Frauen als juristische Personen betrachtet wurden, ihre Rechte kannten, ihre eigenen Fälle ohne Vormund einreichten und haftbar gemacht oder freigesprochen wurden oder ihre Rechte erhielten. Obwohl Frauen in vielen Aspekten der theoretischen religiösen Regeln für Zeugenaussagen benachteiligt waren, wurden die Zeugenaussagen von Frauen vor Gericht akzeptiert, unabhängig von ihrem Glauben, Familienstand, ihrer Freiheit oder Versklavung, ungeachtet der im Islamischen Recht dargelegten theoretischen Aspekte in Bezug auf Zeugenaussagen von Frauen. (Die Meinungen reichen von der völligen Ablehnung weiblicher Zeugenaussagen in bestimmten Rechtsbereichen
über die bedingte Annahme oder die Forderung einer unterstützenden männlichen Zeugenaussage bis hin zur Akzeptanz weiblicher Zeugenaussagen.) Die Aussagen sowohl muslimischer Frauen als auch von Frauen aus religiösen Minderheiten, auch gegen Muslime, wurden vor einem Scharia-Gericht akzeptiert. Während kanonisierte Rechtstheorien Nicht-Muslime nicht als gleichwertig mit Muslimen betrachten und ihre Aussagen gegen Muslime verbieten und einschränken, deutet die tatsächliche Behandlung von Nicht-Muslimen vor Gericht auf Fairness und Gerechtigkeit hin, unabhängig von der Religion des Klägers/Beklagten, und unterstreicht säkulare ethische Normen. Andere von Frauen vor Gericht eingereichte Klagen beanstanden den Missbrauch des Rechts auf einseitige Scheidung durch ihren Ehemann, wenden sich gegen Zwangsverheiratung von Kindern, fordern die Bestrafung von Tätern sexueller Belästigung, fordern Entschädigung für verschiedene Missetaten gegen Frauen und wehren
sich gegen Vorwürfe der Verleumdung und Zinā (Ehebruch).
Die ausgewählten Fälle heben die Stimmen verschiedener ägyptischer Frauen hervor, junger und alter, verheirateter und unverheirateter, Musliminnen und Angehörige religiöser Minderheiten, Sklaven und ihrer Nachkommen, gebildeter Fachkräfte, analphabetischer Stadtbewohner und Bauern, und die Urteile stellen einige vorherrschende akademische Diskurse in Frage.

Im Jahre 1994 ist Anke von Kügelgens bahnbrechende Studie „Averroes & die arabische Moderne“ in Leiden erschienen. Das Buch hatte einen sehr unmittelbaren Effekt auf die deutschsprachige Forschung über die zeitgenössische Philosophie in der islamischen Welt, der sich zum Beispiel am vierten Band des Projektes „Philosophie in der islamischen Welt“ im Rahmen der Neuauflage von Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundrisses der Geschichte der Philosophie messen lässt. Dort schreiben fast zwanzig, in ihrer Mehrzahl deutschsprachige Autor:innen über maßgebliche Philosoph:innen in der islamischen Welt des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Viele der Autor:innen sind Schüler und Schülerinnen von Kügelgens. Die Bedeutung von „Averroes & die arabische Moderne“ lässt sich unter anderem daran messen, dass es weder im englisch-sprachigen noch im französischsprachigen Raum eine ähnlich tiefe und kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der jüngeren Philosophiegeschichte in der islamischen Welt gibt. Von Kügelgens Studie wurde nicht in diese Sprachen übersetzt, und es liegt nur ein kurzer Artikel auf English vor, wo sie ihre Ergebnisse in knapper Form präsentiert. Aus eigener Erfahrung kann ich bestätigen, dass von Kügelgens Studie und ihre Ergebnisse in der englischsprachigen Welt weitgehend unbekannt sind.
Dreißig Jahre nach Erscheinen versuche ich die Bedeutung dieses Buches einzuschätzen und die Ergebnisse einer Prüfung zu unterziehen. Hier bietet der Survey der modernen islamischen Philosophiegeschichte im vierten Band des Ueberweg-Projektes Gelegenheit, Entwicklungen, die von Kügelgen in ihrer Studie angezeigt hat, zu verfolgen. Ist von Kügelgelns Fokus auf die Rezeption des Averroes repräsentativ? Hätte die Rezeption anderer islamischer Denker der frühmodernden Periode zu ähnlich weitreichenden Resultaten geführt? Schließlich, wie hat sich der Diskurs, den von Kügelgen 1994 aufzeigt, seitdem entwickelt?

The periphery of the Muslim world, consisting of regions and communities on its fringes, has wielded considerable influence in shaping Islam across history. I will focus the multifaceted impacts of peripheral Muslims on Islam, spotlighting ʽAlī ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī (d. 870 AD) as an illustrative case study in the Abbasid Era. The presentation will argue that throughout history converts, such as ʽAlī ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī, who once belonged to a peripheral minority in the Muslim majority context, converts have played a key role in shaping the Islamic world and contributing Islamic civilization.
Al-Ṭabarī’s teachings, writings, and interactions with other cultures have not only enriched Islamic traditions but have also greatly influenced the evolution of Islamic thought. As a prominent scholar and polymath of the 9th century, Al-Ṭabarī exemplifies the multifaceted impact of periphery on Islam. Emerging from the fringe of the Islamic world, Al-Ṭabarī made significant contributions to various aspects of Islamic civilization, spanning cultural, scientific, medical, and literary domains.
In his book Al-Radd ʿalā l-Naṣārā (Refutation of the Christians), Al-Ṭabarī articulates the motivation behind his conversion to Islam after seventy years of being a Christian. He aimed to distance himself from Christianity and extend advice to all Christians, ensuring his commitment to Islam was not misconstrued. Embedded within these sentiments lies Al-Ṭabarī's profound conviction and his transition from the margins to the center of Muslim intellectual circles. Embedded within these few sentences, the reader can discern Al-Ṭabarī's profound conviction and the pivotal strides he made towards influencing the core of the Muslim community, transitioning from the periphery. In situating Al-Ṭabarī within the Muslim periphery, it is crucial to acknowledge the multiple marginal positions he held during his time. These encompass his identity as a new Muslim convert, his origins from the non-Arab region of Tabaristan, and his primary professional identity as a physician.
The presentation will argue that throughout history converts, such as ʽAlī ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī, who once belonged to a peripheral minority in the Muslim majority context, converts have played a key role in shaping the Islamic world and contributing Islamic civilization. Al-Ṭabarī’s teachings, writings, and interactions with other cultures have not only enriched Islamic traditions but have also greatly influenced the evolution of Islamic thought. As a prominent scholar and polymath of the 9th century, Al-Ṭabarī exemplifies the multifaceted impact of periphery on Islam. Emerging from the fringe of the Islamic world, Al-Ṭabarī made significant contributions to various aspects of Islamic civilization, spanning cultural, scientific, medical, and literary domains.
In my presentation, I will demonstrate how his background from the periphery as a convert has positively impacted Muslim communities and his pioneering role in medicine and polemical comparative religion within Muslim centers.

Maslama al-Qurṭubī (gest. 353/964) ist der Verfasser eines der bekanntesten Lehrwerke der
Magie in der islamischen Welt, der Ġāyat al-ḥakīm (Das Ziel des Weisen).
Al-Qurṭubī war ein Zeitgenosse von al-Fārābī und wirkte in al-Andalus, dem iberischen Gebiet,
das vom 2./8. bis zum 9./15. Jahrhundert von Muslimen beherrscht wurde. Bekannt ist, dass
sich der Verfasser dieses Werkes bei seinen philosophischen Betrachtungen über die Welt auf
antike und spätantike Lehren bezieht. Doch weniger bekannt und bislang kaum beachtet ist der
Umstand, dass er auch philosophische Ideen islamischer Gelehrter, insbesondere von al-Kindī
(gest. zwischen 247/861 und 252/866) und al-Fārābī (gest. 339/950) in seine Lehre
einbezogen hat.
Der Vortrag zeigt auf, welchen Stellenwert al-Qurṭubī der Philosophie zumisst und warum diese
für seine Thesen von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Die Lehre dieses weit bekannten Magiers aus
dem 4./10. Jahrhundert präsentiert mithin einen Wandel im frühen okkulten Denken der
islamischen Welt, das sich zwar auf die antiken Lehren stützt, diese aber modifiziert, kreativ
mit neuen Ideen weiterentwickelt und direkte Verbindungslinien zum aktuellen
philosophischen Diskurs aufweist.

Climate change, the loss of biodiversity and the pollution of water, land and the air affect not only
people’s living conditions, but also their relations with other people and with the state. Examples in the Middle East include heat waves in Northern Iraq and Syria to more than 50°C for weeks in summer, groundwater salinisation in the Nile Delta, sea water rise in Southern Iraq, soil degradation in Turkey and Iran, drought in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and air pollution in all major cities. Water scarcity and pollution of water, land and air are already affecting food and energy security, rural livelihoods and health, and are expected to further increase.
However, the impacts do not and will not hit all inhabitants in the same way; some groups suffer more than others and hence call for compensation. Furthermore, environmental management measures and climate action can consolidate power structures and asymmetries, further marginalizing vulnerable groups. This is particularly the case in countries that have limited interest articulation and aggregation, which is a core function in environmental/climate policy. While compensations are key for the governments’ legitimacy, environmental change may also restrict their scope of action for instance when they are unable to satisfy demand for irrigation water due to water scarcity. The social contracts between governments and the different fractions of society might thus have to be renegotiated. At the same time, these very social contracts contribute to the environmental problems themselves.
Overuse of water and land resources and privileged access for some groups who exploit them at the expense of other groups are arrangements of some social contracts, but also contribute to further resource degradation.
The paper presents a conceptual framework on this co-constitutive relation between social contracts and environmental change which is also the introduction to the other papers of this panel on “Environmental change and social contracts in the MENA region”.

As oil prices plummeted in 2014-2015, the Saudi government sought alternative sources of revenue to offset fiscal losses, resorting to price hikes on public utilities. Water prices rose dramatically, with households facing a tenfold increase and some private residences seeing increases of up to 29 times, depending on consumption. This rate adjustment sparked a widespread public outcry, unprecedented in a country known for its limited space for social dissent. To quell the unrest, the leadership dismissed the Minister of Water and Electricity and the CEO of the National Water Company. Similarly, in Kuwait, subsidy reforms faced a backlash, prompting the government to partially backtrack and limit water subsidy cuts to expatriates and the commercial sector, sparing Kuwaiti households.
Today, water is already a central issue for the arid Middle East. While numerous studies have addressed these issues, less is known about how water management issues will shape future state-society relations in the context of a sustainable energy transition. This is particularly relevant for the Arabian Peninsula, which is predominantly desert and has very limited freshwater resources, as it faces immense pressure to transform its energy systems, which rely primarily on emission-intensive hydrocarbons. The challenge is to meet the water needs to promote alternative non-oil but water-intensive hydrogen economies, and to exploit new industrial sectors such as mining and mineral processing (e.g. lithium) with their massive "water thirst". Climate change and demographic growth are increasing the pressure for a sustainable and secure water supply. Inspired by the frameworks of social contract and hydro-social governance, the paper will address the following research question along three dimensions (physical availability, technology & infrastructure, and social power structure):
• How do physical changes (e.g., increased water demand amidst decreasing availability) and political and socio-economic interventions (e.g., industrial production of freshwater, water conservation regulations) affect the dynamics of the social contract? Who gains and who loses from existing water resource management practices?
The case-based analysis applies a mixed-methods approach, incorporating quantitative data and indicators such as the "Water Stress Index" and the FAO's Aquastat database, as well as qualitative methods such as extensive and rigorous secondary literature review, policy analysis, and ethnographic approaches including expert interviews.
The paper provides a deep insight and analysis into the complex dynamics of hydro-social relations. It suggests that many future challenges, such as energy transition, climate change, and sustainable development, will lead to increased pressure on the hydro-social contract in the Arab Gulf states. Anecdotal evidence already shows that this is a sensitive issue and could lead to disputes. However, critical junctures have so far been avoided because governments currently have the financial and technological capacity to maintain supply requirements without the need to heavily regulate demand.

Scholarly research on environmentalist movements in Egypt has been scant. One notable exception is Sowers (2018), whose seminal work delves into the concept of the “environmentalism of the poor”. However, this paper takes a departure from Sowers' approach, opting instead for social movement theory, particularly the Strategic Interaction Paradigm, which emphasizes the strategic interplay among different actors across various arenas of contention (Jasper & Duyvendak, 2015; Jasper, 2021). Through this lens, the paper critically analyzes the dynamic of environmentalist movements' strategic, contentious, and consensual interactions with the state post-2014, their resistance against neoliberal governance, and their pursuit of a more inclusive and environmentally sustainable social contract that respects the voices and perspectives of local environmental activists.
In this context, the paper places emphasis on five youth-led grassroots environmental initiatives which have garnered significant visibility and relative influence, particularly with Egypt hosting COP27. The paper seeks to address several preliminary research questions: How do grassroots initiatives mobilize in Cairo to advocate for an environmentally sustainable social contract? What framings and strategies do they employ in this endeavor? How do they interact and engage with the government in a restrictive political context? What are the primary arenas of contention regarding the environment, and how do various players respond to one another within these arenas?
To answer these questions, the paper relies on semi-structured interviews with key figures from these organizations as well as input from local and regional experts. The argument put forth is that environmentalist movements, in their pursuit of a new social contract, have adopted a strategy that combines pressure and criticism with strategic alliances with the government. This approach has enabled them to navigate potential repression while maintaining a degree of leverage over the government.

The last decade has seen increasing interest in how societies and governments across the Arab world respond to climate change. On the one hand, political elites have sought to utilize the global transition to renewable energy production in their strategies of authoritarian upgrading by portraying their countries as partners and investment destinations. On the other hand, these regimes must find answers to the profound economic and social impact that climate change will have on their societies. This paper builds upon and contributes to the wider literature on environmental attitudes and more specific research on the governance challenge posed by climate change through an analysis of the factors that shape public support for more government action on climate change. Employing recent Arab Barometer data, it finds that publics across the Arab world regard political and socio-economic reform as part and parcel of their societies’ attempts at addressing the challenges posed by climate change.

Der islamische Religionsunterricht (IRU) in Deutschland ist ein neu entwickeltes Fach, das vielfältigen Erwartungen seitens der Politik, Wissenschaft, Theologie und Öffentlichkeit unterliegt. Dabei geraten die Perspektiven der Hauptakteure des Unterrichts, nämlich der Lehrkräfte und Lernenden, in der Forschung und im Diskurs oft in den Hintergrund. Ziel meiner Studie ist es daher, die Erwartungen dieser beiden Gruppen in den Fokus zu rücken und miteinander zu vergleichen. Im Rahmen meines Panels soll einerseits dieser Vergleich thematisiert werden, andererseits die methodischen Herausforderungen beleuchtet werden, die mit dem Vergleich zweier Gruppen unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstandes verbunden sind.

Mit Blick auf Lehrpläne sowie auf Schulbücher und weitere Lehrmaterialien untersuchte meine Promotion auf der Basis einer Analyse von Bildungsmaterialien sowie von Interviews mit Bildungspolitiker*innen, Kommissionsmitgliedern, Autor*innen und Vertreter*innen der Religionsgemeinschaften, welche Inhalte – nach Meinung der zentralen Akteur*innen – im Islamischen Religionsunterricht vermittelt werden sollen. Dieser Beitrag stellt erste Ergebnisse vor.

This paper investigates the construction of Islamic identity in religious education textbooks produced by DITIB and Millî Görüş, the two major Turkish-Islamic organizations operating in Germany. By integrating conceptual and relational content analysis, the study explores two key aspects: the thematic elements utilized to portray Turkish-Muslim religious self-images and the interplay between particular conceptual constructs in shaping and fostering these idealized representations. By examining how these materials define and promote their understanding of a(n idealized) religious self-image, the study sheds light on the complex interplay between individual faith, collective identity, and distinct or shared cultural context(s). The findings offer insights into the nuanced ways religious education materials influence young Muslims' self-perception and image and their understanding of their place within both German society and their respective Muslim community.

Die Forschungen über religiöse Bewegungen sind nach dem Anschlag vom September 2001 zu einem wichtigen Thema für Forscher, Journalisten und Medien geworden. Die Muslimbruderschaft wurde nach der Zeit des Arabischen Frühlings verstärkt untersucht. Das vorliegende Projekt hat sich dabei zum Ziel gesetzt, einen neueren und zunehmend populärer werdenden Erklärungsansatz kritisch zu überprüfen und konzeptuell weiterzuentwickeln, und zwar den der „Generationen“. Dieser geht im Kern von der Annahme aus, dass sich sowohl Wandlungsprozesse als auch Lagerkämpfe innerhalb der Muslimbruderschaft zu einem beträchtlichen Grad durch Zusammenspiel und Konkurrenz verschiedener generationell definierter Gruppen erklären lassen. Dieser Ansatz ist vielversprechend, da er es ermöglicht, Veränderungen innerhalb der Muslimbruderschaft nicht nur – wie es oft üblich ist – mit wichtigen politischen Ereignissen in Bezug zu bringen, sondern auch mit tieferliegenden
sozioökonomischen und kulturellen Transformationsprozessen. Vor Beginn jeder empirischen Arbeit steht die Frage, welche Forschungsrichtung und Methode sich zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfrage eignet. Für diese Arbeit erscheint die qualitative Methode der geeignete Weg zu sein. Ziel des ist es, auf dem Weg einer qualitativen empirischen Erhebung Erkenntnisse über Prozesse des Generationenwandels in der Muslimbruderschaft innerhalb der letzten 20 Jahre zu gewinnen. Dazu sollen mindestens 60 Mitglieder der syrischen Muslimbruderschaft für ausführliche Leitfadeninterviews gewonnen werden. Um Erkenntnisse über längerfristige Wandlungsprozesse zu ermöglichen, soll das Untersuchungssample Vertreterinnen und Vertreter unterschiedlicher Alterskohorten enthalten, möglichst ungefähr zu gleichen Teilen älterer Personen (< 60 Jahre alt), Personen mittleren Alters (40-60 Jahre alt) und eher jüngeren Personen (< 40 Jahre alt).

This paper maps how valuations of olive oil produced in Syria’s Afrin have developed in the past fifty years. It demonstrates that changing material worth or price not only reflects the attribution of particular qualities through branding or marketing, but is also shaped by wider political orders.
In the 20th century, the number of olive trees growing in Afrin increased considerably, although olives have been cultivated here since antiquity. Until the turn of the millennium, cultivating and processing olives, as well as the procedures to judge the acidity and quality of oil, were small-scale and labour-intensive occupations with only very limited mechanisation; this changed only gradually after 2000 with the limited opening of markets and technological change. Olive oil produced in Afrin, referred to as “Kurdish oil” (zeyt kurdi) in reflection of the local population, was highly appreciated due to its palatability and taste. A decisive and quite violent rupture was
marked by the occupation of Afrin by Islamist militias under Turkish control in 2018.
Among other changes, it forcefully displaced a large part of the local Kurdish population while Arabic settlers from other parts of Syria moved in. Olive cultivation, too, was impacted, as farmers were dispossessed by the seizing or “taxing” of the olive harvest, while orchards and trees were damaged or destroyed. Olive oilproduced in Afrin was robbed and plundered at a large scale and, as contraband, then flooded the Turkish market, considerably devaluing the price of oil.
Asking how the transformations outlined above have shaped changing valuations of olive oil from Afrin, this paper draws from earlier visits to Afrin and conversations with (former) inhabitants of the region as well as published reports and accounts on social media.

When the Dubai Mall opened in the late 2000s as one of the world’s largest shopping centres, it immediately became a central feature of the brand of a city seeking global attention. In this place full of aspirations for superlatives and deliberate symbolism, a central corner of the mall immediately caught the eye: glittering, decorated to a high standard, sophisticatedly illuminated, staffed by distinguished personnel, and with sparse displays of the items on sale, it appeared to be a cluster of expensive jewellery shops, but on second glance quickly revealed itself to be a collection of chocolate shops offering lavishly packaged, high-priced pralines and fine bars. The excelling quality of the confectionery on offer was also demonstrated by the presence of many renowned brands in the chocolate industry, from well-known Western brands to products from highly esteemed Arab confectioners.
Based on a photo-geographical exploration, the presentation explores the glittering world of chocolate shops in the Dubai Mall. With the global expansion of shopping malls, they have also spread to the Arab Gulf states and become urban landmarks. At the same time, there are references to traditional stgs as local precursors; in particular, the strong high concentration of chocolate shops reminds us of the spatial specialisation of crafts and shops. A central aspect of the talk is the qualification and singularisation of products as luxury goods; their demonstrative consumption is of particular importance in the Gulf states. The Gulf region has increasingly become an important market, but also a trading hub and production site for luxury chocolate. Therefore, drawing on existing work by Karpik, Callon, and Reckwitz and its further development towards qualification processes and quality as a social construct, the paper presents an approach to the “preciosisation” of consumer items such as chocolate.

Making wine in Turkey has never been an easy endeavour. Except for the state-supported comfortable years of the early Republican Era, wine producers have either suffered from various agricultural diseases, or have had to tackle the chronic problems of poor local demand for wine and poor reputation of its quality. Added to these, firms operating in this industry have also dealt with a wide range of cultural issues related to making and promoting an alcoholic beverage in a Muslim country. Over the past two decades however, along with the rise of political Islam, the local sector has even faced greater challenges at the policy level. The imposition of escalating tax rates, the restriction on internet sales involving alcoholic beverages, and the prohibition of subcontract production of wine, are examples of recent controversial policies enacted by the conservative government.
Under these conditions, economic survival depends on agents’ own capabilities, including their qualification strategies, and women entrepreneurs are no exception. The purpose of this paper is to provide a gender-based perspective of the Turkish wine industry. It aims to understand how the social production of wine in Anatolia revolves around women. In so doing, the paper also aims to contribute to women’s entrepreneurship literature (Marlow and McAdam 2015; McAdam et.al. 2019). The paper seeks to answer the following research guestions: Given the male-dominated character of the industry, do female winemakers and women working in wine face problems in the industry stemming from being women? If so, how do they challenge institutional norms and earn their entrepreneurial identities? Do they pursue specific strategies to produce and promote quality wines? The qualitative research is based on semi-structured interviews with women owner-managers of small and medium-sized wineries across Turkey.

When the phylloxera crisis decimated vineyards in France from the 1860s onward, the French were forced to import wines from Spain and Italy to satisfy their daily needs. To avoid this dependence on foreign products, French consumers turned to the other side of the Mediterranean, to the French colony of Algeria, where new vineyards – owned and controlled by French settlers – began to take root. Hailed as the saviour of French drinking habits, Algerian wine was, for a moment, the hero of the hour in Belle Époque France, yet once French vineyards recovered, this product of settler colonialism came to be viewed as an unwanted and unnecessary surplus. Consequently, Algerian wines started to be treated with suspicion. They were suspected of containing fraudulent additives, and vignerons in France rejected the importation of Algerian wines as an encroachment of “the ‘divine right’ of metropolitan viticulture”, as the historian John Strachan succinctly put it in a 2007 article.
Despite these protests by the metropolitan wine lobby, Algeria came to be one of the largest
global wine exporters by the mid-20th century.
When the Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) system was established by a group of vocal
French vignerons in the 1930s, as a measure of protecting French local traditions and know-
how on the one hand and of establishing a means of quality control on the other, Algerian –
and other colonial – wines were explicitly excluded from it. Algerian wines, it was decided,
did not stem from what was defined as France. Several Algerian versions of the AOC were
either attempted or implemented, in order to guarantee the quality of Algerian wines and
calm metropolitan consumer reservations. This paper suggests that the AOC system was,
from its beginning, aimed against colonial products, despite the wider French pretensions of
Algeria being an integral part of France.

Die Teilnehmenden versammeln sich in Raum 0.120 und gehen von dort gemeinsam zur Numismatik-Sammlung.

Der Bereich der islamischen Numismatik gehört zu den bedeutenden Wissenschaften im Bereich der archäologischen, historischen und zivilisatorischen Studien. Er verfügt über dokumentarische Werkzeuge, die viele Informationen offenlegen enthüllen, die, ohne den Rückgriff auf diese Wissenschaft nur schwer zu erkennen gewesen wären. Islamische Münzen sind offizielle Dokumente, die von der staatlichen Münzstätte unter der Aufsicht des Kalifen oder Herrschers – sei es ein Sultan, König, Emir, oder Statthalter herausgegeben wurden. Die eingravierten Informationen auf den Münzen wurden daher unter der Auswahl und Aufsicht dieser Herrscher festgelegt. Daher ist das Studium dieser Inschriften, Gravuren und Verzierungen von großer Bedeutung als historisches Dokument, dessen Wert und Authentizität nicht in Frage gestellt werden können. Es spielt eine wichtige Rolle bei der Neubetrachtung der islamischen Geschichte.
Die Orientalische islamische Sammlung in der Uni Göttingen besteht aus, Erstens: Die Sammlung von Asch: So sandte der Arzt Baron Georg von Asch von seiner Wirkungsstätte St. Petersburg aus, neben anderen Objekten auch russische und orientalische Münzen als Schenkung an die Universität Göttingen. Die Sammlung umfasst zirka 950 Münzen des islamischen Kulturkreises. Zweitens: Die Bachmann Sammlung. Peter Bachmann war von 1979 bis 2001 als Professor am Seminar für Arabistik um Islamwissenschaft in Göttingen tätig. Im Jahr 1991 stifteten Bachmann und seine Frau die islamische Münzsammlung der Uni Göttingen. Die Bachmann Sammlung umfasst mehr als 3000 Münzen des islamischen Kulturkreises, besonders umayyadische und Abbasidische Münzen.

Hezbollah, founded in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War, emerged as a Shiite militant and political organization with the aim of resisting Israeli aggression against Arab/Moslem territories. Iran, after the revolution of 1979, began to support Hezbollah emphasizing their shared Shiite ideology and strategic interests in the region. Iran plays a pivotal role in supporting Hezbollah through extensive financial aid, advanced weaponry, and military training, enabling the group to maintain its operations and influence in Lebanon and beyond. This support is part of Iran's broader strategy to establish the "Axis of Resistance," which includes Syria and various militant groups in Iraq and Yemen, aiming to counter Western and Israeli influence in the Middle East and strengthen Iran's regional dominance. The 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah, also known as the 2006 Lebanon War, began on July 12, 2006, following Hezbollah's cross-border raid and ended on August 14, 2006. Iran's proxy groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various militias in Gaza and Syria, heighten tensions with Israel by engaging in periodic cross-border attacks, rocket fire, and asymmetric warfare. These groups serve as Iran's frontline in its strategy to destabilize Israel and challenge its security, acting as a deterrent against direct retaliation on Iranian soil while promoting Tehran's geopolitical objectives. The aim of this study is to enlighten Iran’s role in Tensions within the greater MENA region, the effects of international pressures/sanctions on Iranian activities and to propose alternative roadmaps to ease conflicts and reduce supportive pressure of Iran on its proxy groups. It is assumed that reducing international pressure on Iran, would lead to stability and eventual peace in the Middle East. The research method of the article descriptive-analytical article is ocumentary and field in place.

My contribution aims to analyze the fate of the Druze of Idlib in Syria. The approach adopted is innovative regarding the state of the literature on this topic. My paper will update and offer new perspectives to my previous work with the Austrian researcher Tobias Lang (Abou Diab, Lang, 2014). While the Druze form a “compact minority” in the south of Mount Lebanon and the southwest of Syria (Hourani, Birgit), this is not the case for the Druze of Idlib. The latter constitute the most geographically distant Druze population center. The Syrian conflict has increased their geographical marginalization. The Islamic State, followed by Jabhat al-Nosra, had effective control over the Druze mountain of Idlib which had fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. Druze notables agreed to convert to Islam in order to keep their lands and preserve their lives.
While the situation appears to be better, in fact the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (also known as HTS) has established a de facto government – the National Salvation Government –which governs Idlib governorate. Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, the leader of HTS, has attempted to portray himself as a 'defender of minorities' to improve his image and ultimately gain the West’s sympathy. In light of this situation, what are the implications for the other Druze communities in the Middle East ?
I argue that these implications have led Walid Jumblatt, the traditional leader of Lebanon's Druze community, to emphasise his community's rapprochement with Sunni Islam. This argument cannot be fully understood without studying the Druze’s representations and strategies in a longue durée approach. I will use the geopolitical method of the French geopolitical school as well as my personal research to test this hypothesis. The primary aim is therefore study the political behavior of the Druze in times of crisis.

The financial crisis in the 19th century forced the Ottoman rulers to establish control on the state revenues and state institutions responsible for tax collection via institutional reforms and the Ottoman customs were among these institutions. The institutional structure and personnel employment policies were changed in the Ottoman customs to tax both domestic and foreign trade through customs and to adapt to the international trade and customs order after 1860. A Customs Regulation containing institutional organization and personnel policies was adopted on 28 October 1860, and Ottoman customs were gathered under the administration of the Ottoman Rüsûmât Emaneti (Customs Administration) in 1861 and modern school graduates were employed as staff in the Ottoman customs. However, when difficulties were experienced in adapting to the requirements of the international trade agreements and to the changing international customs order since the Ottoman Customs personnel lacked technical knowledge, finance experts in customs transactions were invited from Germany. The first expert was Emil Bertram, a finance expert from Germany served as undersecretary in the Ottoman customs. He prepared a new customs regulation and with his suggestion, a customs school named Tariff School was opened in 1893 in order to train estimators who would apply the new tariff system.
After Bertram foreign experts were appointed as undersecretaries in the Ottoman customs to maintain knowledge and skill transfer from Europe, and Sir Richard Crawford, an experienced customs officer from England was the last of them. Crawford introduced the Declaration system to the Ottoman customs and opened another Tax Officials School to teach the declaration system to Ottoman staff. This study is prepared to examine the reforms in the Ottoman customs started in 1860 and transfer of knowledge and skills through foreign experts invited from Europe and personel education policies by consulting archival sources and academic studies to contribute to Ottoman Economic History.

Der Beitrag behandelt speziell Fragen zu Recht und (Post-)Kolonialismus in British India und Pakistan. Er setzt sich zum Ziel, anhand einer Untersuchung der Bedeutung des Korans als ein von vielen Muslimen als heilig eingestuftes Objekt und dessen rechtlichen Schutzes, das Zusammenspiel kolonialer und post-kolonialer Rechtsordnungen darzustellen.
Ausgehend von anthropologischen, historischen und religionswissenschaftlichen Arbeiten der letzten 10 Jahren, die sich mit der Materialität des Korans in Bezug auf Gebräuche und religionsgemeinschaftliche Normen in Kenia, Ägypten und Tunesien auseinandergesetzt haben, möchte dieser Beitrag darlegen, wie im Laufe der letzten 70 Jahre erst in mehreren Provinzen im kolonialen Indien und seit 1973 auch in Pakistan, eine Serie von Gesetzen verabschiedet worden sind, die den Lebenszyklus des Korans als Objekt bildlich gesprochen von der Wiege bis zur Bahre begleiten. Beginnend mit der Verabschiedung des indischen Strafgesetzbuchs im
Jahr 1860 im kolonialen Indien und endend mit den 2022 Gesetzesänderungen (amendments) des Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act von 2011, untersucht dieser Beitrag eine Rechtsentwicklung, die sich nicht nur mit dem Objekt, dem physischen Buch also, auseinandersetzt sondern auch mit seiner Übersetzung und Auslegung. Die britische Kolonialverwaltung hat den Koran eher widerwillig geschützt. Über die Jahre hat die pakistanische Rechtsordnung diesen Schutz jedoch sehr stark ausgebaut, bishin zum Erbauen von „Ruhestätten“ für alte oder zerlesene Koranbücher.
Obwohl das Thema des Schutzes des Korans in den letzten Jahren vor allem in den Medien durch Verbrennungen des Korans in Schweden und Dänemark einerseits, und Lynchjustiz durch aufgebrachte Mengen in Pakistan sehr präsent geworden ist, gibt es bislang keine wissenschaftliche Arbeit im europäischen Raum, die sich gezielt mit der Frage beschäftigt, wie der pakistanische Staat den Koran schützt, und welche Konsequenzen dieser Schutz für die Rechtsordnung und insbesondere Grundrechte von in Pakistan lebenden Muslimen and Nicht-Muslimen hat. Dies ist auch daran ersichtlich, dass die diesem Beitrag zugrundeliegenden
Primärquellen, wie zum Beispiel interne Korrespondenz der britischen Kolonialverwaltung, parlamentarische Debatten auf Länder- und Bundesebene, Gesetzesentwürfe, Gesetzestexte sowie Verordnungen, und Gerichtsurteilen, größtenteils bislang noch nie wissenschaftlich behandelt oder dargestellt worden sind.

The legal system of Pakistan has its roots in the English common law. The establishment of the Federal Sharīꜥat Court and the promulgation of the controversial Ḥudūd Ordinance in 1979
by the then General Zia ul-Haq (d. 1988) ushered in a period of Islamisation. The ordinance
brought fornication and rape under the umbrella concept of “fornication” (zinā) renaming rape as
“coerced fornication” (zinā bil jabr). This created a political-religious dichotomy in Pakistan,
where the Islamisation of laws is often met with criticism from the secular segment of society with the demand to annul the Ḥudūd Ordinance altogether. Its proponents argue that instead of
completely scrapping it, some aspects of the law need to be reviewed. The Protection of Women
Act 2006 repealed all the provisions regarding zinā bil jabr in the Ḥudūd Ordinance. However,
removing rape from the ḥadd offence to a “discretionary punishment” (taꜥzīr) has made it lose its
distinctive status within the law.
Some scholars suggest that rape should be specified as a crime of “violent appropriation”
(ḥirāba) in the Ḥudūd Ordinance while others advocate resolving the issue through the Ḥanafī
doctrine of political authority (siyāsa). The colonial state’s arrogation of sovereignty transformed
the diverse nature of this siyāsa shariꜥyya into a more uniform statist siyāsa. The English Common Law blurred the ḥadd punishments due to the binary division of public and private. Therefore, Pakistani jurists support a thorough analysis of the Ḥanafī legal manuals and promulgation of the doctrine of siyāsa to solve the conflict in the Ḥudūd laws of Pakistan. This paper will evaluate all these positions and arguments taken by scholars from the perspective of the Ḥudūd Ordinance and analyse how the issue of rape has been dealt with by Pakistani jurists.
Key words: rape, ḥudūd, zinā bil jabr, ḥirāba, siyāsa, taꜥzīr, Pakistan, Ḥanafī fiqh

In the Spring of 1929, the highest French officials in Tunis were in an unusual state of alarm. The
cause was an anonymous letter written in Arabic menacing the ministry and its magistrates with an ‘explosion with dynamite’ in case of any further ‘abuse of the sharia’. The letter was sent in response to planned reforms to the sharia courts, which included the introduction of selection procedures for its judges.
Since the very establishment of the Protectorate in 1881, French colonial bureaucrats had taken a
special interest in the law. Subsequent Legal Commissions had developed and implemented legal interventions in the Régence de Tunis. As Tunisia was strictly speaking not a colony but a
‘protectorate’, the law that applied to the colonized remained officially within the competence of the Tunisian Bey and his officials. In the first decades of the protectorate, colonial law, a term that refers to a wide range of legal regimes in the colonies (Comaroff, 2001; Merry, 2010; Koskenniemi, 2016).
hence primarily aimed at regulating the European population. However, as the 1929 upheaval shows, the French bureaucrats became increasingly interested in controlling the law governing the local population.
This paper traces the polemic around the reform of the sharia courts on the basis of documentation retrieved from the Archives Diplomatiques Françaises. It considers the polemic within the context of ongoing debates between French officials and local elites on the limits to legal intervention. In these debates, (French and Tunisian) opponents to extensive legal interference regularly pointed to the distinction between La Régence de Tunis and French Algeria, which was a French département.
Supporters of an increasing interference on the other hand testify to an awareness of the potentials of Law to what Roberts and Mann (1991) call ‘discipline the colonized’.

References:
Comaroff, John L., ‘Colonialism, culture, and the law: a foreword’, Law and Social Inquiry 2001, pp. 305-314.
Koskenniemi, Marti, ‘Colonial laws: sources, strategies and lessons?’, Journal of the history of
International Law 18 (2016), 248-277.
Mann, Kristin & Richard Roberts, ‘Law in Colonial Africa’, in Kristin Mann & Richard Roberts (eds)
Law in Colonial Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), 3-58.
Merry. Sally E., ‘Colonial law and its uncertainties’, Law and History Review 28/4 (2010), 1067-1071.

Im Rahmen dieses Beitrags gehe ich der Frage nach, wie die Vielschichtigkeit des philosophischen Werks ʿAbdarraḥmān Badawīs (1917-2002) erfasst werden kann. Hierfür differenziere ich zwischen verschiedenen Untersuchungsebenen, anhand derer unterschiedliche Dimensionen von Badawīs Werk identifiziert und konstitutiv aufeinander bezogen werden können. Erstens fungiert die Argumentanalyse (Verdeutlichung der argumentativen Linien, der expliziten philosophiehistorischen Bezüge und der Semantik der Begrifflichkeiten) als Grundlage für weiterführende Überlegungen auf der kontextuellen Ebene. Kontextualisierenden Ansätzen folgend interpretiere ich zweitens Badawīs Werk in seiner Genese innerhalb von sich überlagernden transnationalen und lokalen intellektuellen Denkräumen an der Universität Kairo und unter der Einbettung in den zeitgenössischen historisch-politischen Kontext. Ausgehend von dieser Situierung lese ich drittens Badawīs radikal subjektivistische Auslegung der Existenzphilosophie in Kombination mit der in seiner Kulturphilosophie angelegten Möglichkeit einer kulturellen Erneuerung politisch: als Mittel zu einer kognitiven Emanzipation und einer damit einhergehenden Neuverhandlung der ägyptischen Gesellschaft.

In diesem Beitrag befasse ich mich mit der zeitgenössischen englisch-arabischen Konstellation der philosophischen Begriffe secularism/secularity und ʿalmāniyya. Beide Begriffe werden üblicherweise als identisch betrachtet, und in der Forschung über die MENA-Region werden secularism und secularity als Analysekategorien oder Konzepte global eingesetzt. Dies ist auf den ersten Blick und in der Logik vorwiegend analytisch-deskriptiver wissenschaftlicher Zugänge zu sozio-politischen Konfigurationen durchaus stimmig. Zudem gibt es zahlreiche Querverweise zwischen Diskursen, Begriffen und Vorstellungen, so etwa Übersetzungen; hier gilt ʿalmāniyya gemeinhin als arabischsprachige Entsprechung von secularism/secularity [das arabische Wort kann grammatikalisch gesehen beide Bedeutungen annehmen]. Bei genauerer Betrachtung der philosophischen Ebene zeigt sich aber, dass secularism/secularity und ʿalmāniyya sowohl im Hinblick auf die konzeptionelle Fassung als auch die damit verbundenen philosophischen Diskurse und Argumentationen stark divergieren und dass hier eine direkte Übersetzung des einen Begriffs in den anderen irreführend ist. In meinem Beitrag veranschauliche ich dies anhand von ausgewählten Beispielen (Fuad Zakariyya, Adel Daher, Sadiq al-Azm und Nassif Nassar). Ausgehend hiervon plädiere ich dafür, secularism/secularity und ʿalmāniyya als Ko-Präsenz mit bestimmten Überlappungen und zugleich deutlichen Unterschieden zu verstehen. Die Frage, wie auf der Grundlage des präzisen Verständnisses dieser konzeptionellen Konstellation beide Konzepte fruchtbar miteinander in Beziehung gesetzt werden können, bildet den Abschluss des Beitrags.

Der Vortrag rekonstruiert den situierten Universalismus (vgl. Dhawan 2017; Césaire 1955) im Werk des marokkanischen Intellektuellen und Historiker Abdallah Laroui (*1933). Dabei argumentiere ich, dass Larouis Form der Analyse eine postfundamentalistische (Marchart 2010), selbstreflexive, negativ dialektische Form der Kritik darstellt, die zwischen verschiedenen epistemologischen Rahmen und Sprachen übersetzt, ohne dabei einen Rahmen oder eine Tradition festzuschreiben. Ich zeige, wie Laroui dabei Übersetzung als eine strategische Praxis der Kritik entwirft. Vermittels einer Reflexion der Epistemologie der Geschichte öffnet Laroui einen Raum für die Rekonfiguration der Fundamente des Politischen (als der Zone des Streits um Begründungen von Gemeinschaft). Auf diese Weise macht er bestehende Debatten über das Partikulare und das Universelle in postkolonialen Zusammenhängen komplexer lesbar, da er beide als miteinander verschränkt konzipiert. Im letzten Schritt arbeite ich heraus, wie Larouis kritische Perspektive auf kulturalistische Formen der Übersetzung neue Perspektiven auf die Frage nach der Übersetzbarkeit westlicher und nicht-westlicher Theorie liefert.

Die Auseinandersetzung iranischer Philosoph:innen mit der westlichen Philosophie und dem politischen Denken ab dem späten 19. Jahrhundert löste eine lebhafte Übersetzungsbewegung aus, die bis heute stetig zunimmt. In diesem Vortrag werde ich einen kurzen Überblick über diese Übersetzungsaktivitäten geben, beginnend mit der frühesten Übersetzung von Descartes Discours de la méthode, und einige Merkmale verschiedener Formen und Gattungen von Adaptionen diskutieren, die als Übersetzungen politischen Denkens verstanden werden können. Abschließend werde ich einige Trends, Strategien und Protagonisten der besonders aktiven Phase der philosophischen Übersetzung während der Reformära unter Khatami bis zur Zeit der Grünen Bewegung diskutieren. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei darauf, die Übersetzungen mit den aktuellen politischen Diskursen der Zeit ihrer Entstehung in Beziehung setzen. Dabei soll eine vorläufige Bewertung der diskursiven Kontexte, der Vielfalt und des Einflusses herausragender Übersetzer und übersetzter Werke im modernen Iran versucht und die Frage beleuchten werden, warum und wie die Übersetzung eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Entwicklung des modernen politischen Denkens im Iran gespielt hat.

The concept of the social contract has recently been used to analyse state-society relations and those between different social groups in relation to their mutual ‘deliverables’. It conceptualizes the key-deliverables of provision, protection and participation as duties of the state in exchange for its citizens’ loyalty (Loewe et al 2021). Work on the ‘rural social contract’ has dealt with the role of water and land resources for state legitimacy, and on environmental change as a driver of change in social contracts (Houdret/Kadiri/Bossenbroek 2017; Houdret/ Amichi 2020). However, even if taking discourses and narratives into account, these approaches primarily focused on the material dimension of the social contract.
The present research adds the dimension of ‘justice’ to the social contract concept, in order to better grasp its legitimacy and the effects of (in)justice on changes in related arrangements. Drawing on the Environmental Justice literature, it uses ‘recognitional justice’ as a cross-cutting category throughout the three deliverables. The social contract’s (SC) categories of provision and participation are similar to the Environmental Justice’s (EJ) understandings of, respectively, distributive justice and procedural justice. While the SC adds the dimension of ‘protection’, the EJ school of thought includes the aspect of recognition as a central element to state-society relations. ‘Recognitional justice’ refers to the inclusion and respect of diverse values, identities and forms of knowledge of all stakeholders (Massarella et al., 2020; Rodriguez/Clarke: submitted). As a crosscutting category throughout the SC’s three deliverables, we conceptualise recognition as an important basis of the SC’s legitimacy.
This assumption also draws on research findings from the peace and conflict literature, showing that perceived rather than objective inequality is associated with increased risk of civil war (Must 2016), or that perceived justice matters for the stability of peace agreements (Druckmann/ Wagner 2017).
Based on this framework of analysis, empirical investigations focusing on women in Southern
Morocco’s Draa valley seek to answer two main research questions: (a) How does environmental
change affect women’s protection, provision and participation? And (b) Which role does recognition play for the perceived legitimacy of all three deliverables of the social contract? The results will provide the basis for an assessment of the impact of environmental change on women in the social contract, and on opportunities for its renegotiation.
The Moroccan Draa valley is among the poorest regions of the country, with overall low levels of
public services. Agriculture is the region’s main source of income, but increasingly threatened by the degradation of water and land resources. Women used to play an important role in the oases’
farming systems, and women associations, often also based on agricultural products, have allowed them to create spaces and financial means for independence in a highly patriarchal context.
Environmental change with a degradation of the quality and quantity of water and arable land
contributes to restricting not only the women’s income opportunities, but also their spaces for social interaction and political mobilisation (Bossenbroek/ Fthouhi year TBC).
The present contribution uses the combined approach of the social contract and environmental
justice to analyse the impact of environmental change on rural women in the Draa valley, and how
this affects the social contract and related opportunities for its renegotiation.

The international development debate is increasingly referring to the notion of the ‘social contract’ – often, however, without a clear definition of the term and its implications. Many authors also call for ‘better social contracts’ without making explicit by which criteria they would assess the quality of a social contract. We therefore make a suggestion for measuring at least some elements of social contracts in order to ease their comparison across time and geography. We build on a concept developed earlier, according to which social contracts are the “entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (i.e. the government or any other actor in power), defining their rights and obligations towards each other” (Loewe, Zintl and Houdret, 2021, P. 3). Specifically, we develop indices to capture the three ‘Ps’ that governments can deliver to societies: protection against internal and external threats, provision of social and economic services and allowing political participation. These indices are composed of indicators for the different aspects or dimensions of the three ‘Ps’. We use mainly input variables to gauge the willingness of governments to give because outcome variables depend on too many other factors influencing the efficiency of the political process. In a second step, we also calculate the values of 154 countries for all three indices around the year 2019. The results prove that the three indices are meaningful and consistent. The values stretch over a large range but the means and medians are on similar levels.
The indices correlate to a high degree with each other and with other indicators such as per‐capita income and the Human Development Index. Yet, the correlations are not at all perfect, which means that the three indices add information on the performance of governments in different countries.
Finally, we even make a first set in the detection of significant patterns in the results. Particularly, we find noticeable geographic clusters of social contracts with similar characteristics: For example, countries in Latin America have been doing comparatively well on average in terms of political participation in 2019. Governments in sub‐Sahara Africa, in turn have been delivering disproportionately on average in terms of protection and political participation if we take per‐capita income levels into consideration but less so in terms of provision. And countries in the Middle East and North Africa tend to fail mainly with regards to political participation. Our approach also allows to compare across sub‐indices level. While high protection measures are due to individual security in sub‐Sahara Africa, but due to collective security and the rule of law in some non‐EU Western countries.

Keywords
Social contracts; government performance; comparative politics; political participation; protection; social policies; economic policies; measurement.

In Tunesien stehen sich, mehr als in anderen islamischen Ländern, die arabischislamische Identität und das frankophone, laizistische Denken gegenüber. Beides ist als historisch gewachsenes Erbe wesentlich für die tunesische Bewusstseinsbildung und wirkungsmächtig bei der Ausbildung einer tunesischen Nationalidentität.
Die sich aus der zeitweiligen Frontstellung ergebenden Spannungen wirken sich wiederum unmittelbar auf die Bildungspolitik des Landes aus. Daher wäre eine Untersuchung der
Bildungsreformen in Tunesien unter Ausschluss der politischen Parameter und gesellschaftlichen Umstände nicht möglich, weshalb deren Analyse und Kontextualisierung eine notwendige methodische Voraussetzung dieses Papers darstellen.
Unter den zahlreichen Bildungsreformen Tunesiens liegt das Hauptaugenmerk in diesem Paper auf der Bildungsreform Charfis (1936–2008) – und dabei besonders auf dem Fach »Islamische Erziehung« (at-tarbiya al-isla¯mῑya) –, deren Wirkungszeitraum die Jahre 1989 bis 1994 umfasst. Zunächst werden Auswirkungen der innen- und außenpolitischen Parameter auf die tunesische Bildungspolitik, speziell auf die Religionslehre, herausgearbeitet. Darauf aufbauend sollen Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der Politik der Religionslehre sowie die sich hieraus ergebenden Folgen für die fachliche Ausrichtung in Methodik und Inhalt aufgezeigt werden.

Since the beginning of the current century, Algeria has adopted the LMD system, the university has witnessed a major transformation. Among the measures included in the Department of Arabic Language and Literature is “the Governance and Citizenship” module, which is an interdisciplinary measure between three or more sciences according to the abilities of professors and the extent to which students respond to this, such as sociology, philosophy, history, law and media. The purpose of this study is to answer; How can democratic thinking be effectively taught to third-year Arabic literature students in Algerian universities through the "Governance and Citizenship" module in new manner and different than religious thought?
The study could employ a mixed-methods approach, including:
1. Curriculum analysis of the "Governance and Citizenship" module
2. Pre- and post-module assessments to measure changes in students' understanding of democratic concepts and its value.
We Conduct a comprehensive review of existing research on teaching democratic thinking in higher education, with a focus on Algeria and interdisciplinary approaches, and we examine the Current curriculum of the "Governance and Citizenship" module, including its objectives, content, and teaching methods.
The current teaching of this module in Algerian universities makes many struggles between teachers and students. We try always to facilitate and simplify in many studies and approaches. Should give some epistemological introduction for some scientific fields to make safe interdisciplinary bridging. should discuss about aesthetic literature value to include
another domain with another aesthetic value.

Key words: Democractic thiking, Governance, Citizenship, Algerian University

This paper looks at textbooks as tools for social change and focuses on qualitative and quantitative analysis of a sample of Jordanian textbooks addressing the entry, middle and final stages of primary education in mathematics. By providing an analysis of gendered representations in the sample, the paper highlights the implementation of relevant strategies to safeguard female inclusion. At the same time, it points at the underrepresentation of female role models and at the reiteration of some stereotypical social constructs, especially representing women as alienated from specific working sectors as the vocational one.

This paper examines the settlement process of Circassian refugees who were migrated to the
Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. This study aims to investigate
agency of Circassian refugees in transforming the Quneitra district in the late nineteenth to the
early twentieth century. In this context, I argue that Circassian refugees turned the district of
Quneitra, where they were strategically settled, into an urban centre by changing it politically,
socially and economically. In particular, the first-generation refugee groups settled in the
region engaged with new commercial and agricultural activities that enabled them to adapt
effectively to their settled environment. Circassian refugees, who integrated themselves into
local administration and education with the support of the state, became a permanent
component of the region. This study mainly aims to treat refugees as active actors. The
petitions and newspaper publications written by them along with yearbooks that provide
detailed distribution of district administration and personnel records of refugees were
examined to increase the refugee' visibility. At the end of the study, it is suggested that
Circassian refugees, who adapted to the harsh conditions, transformed the Quneitra district,
which had long been considered unsafe and used only as a pastureland by nomads, into one of
the leading administrative centres of the region within a few decades. These findings highlight
the need of reevaluation of refugee narratives and emphasize that refugees should be
acknowledged as active agents in creating their own destinies and the communities they
inhabit.

This study seeks to examine the influence of linguistic-religious dynamics in shaping political ideologies and the tendency to engage in armed conflict, using the Islamist Resistance Movement Hamas as a case study. It focuses on the ways Hamas has utilized religious rhetoric to construct narratives that resonate deeply with its audience, fostering a sense of collective identity and purpose. To achieve this, the study will draw extensively on Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of language, religion, and symbolic violence, focusing on his 'thinking tools'—habitus, field, and capital— which are crucial for understanding the power and function of religious language in shaping political ideologies and motivating collective action. It will explore how dispositions influence behaviors, unfold power dynamics, and drive struggles for dominance and legitimacy. Additionally, the study will examine how different forms of capital are utilized by actors like Hamas to garner public support. The study aims to reveal how religious rhetoric can mobilize communities, legitimize political actions, and sustain the ideological framework of the conflict.

Literature is a magical tool for teaching Arabic language and culture to students at the advanced level. Arabic is known as a very complicated language to study for many reasons, it is used in different countries and wide areas, which cause various cultures and traditions, it's also a very old language, with a standard language (Fusha) and too many dialects and slangs. This research focuses on using literature to develop the students' competencies, especially pragmatically. Arabic literature has lots of specialties, as it is written in the standard language but also includes phrases from dialects in the conversational parts. Literature also, helps the students to understand lots of cultural aspects and historical and modern cases happening in the Arab world.
Using literature to improve students' competencies, especially pragmatic competence appears to be very effective, and to prove the effectiveness we decided to conduct experimental research using a pre-post-test method to measure the difference in students' pragmatic competence before and after studying literature for one semester. Kanafani Ghassan's novels were selected to be the literature text in the semester of the experience.

Keywords: literature, Culture, Arabic as a second language, Advanced level.

Research plan:
The main purpose of this research is to define the effect of teaching literature on student's competencies, and to answer the main questions of the research:
1- Why literature? What does it provide?
2- When do we teach literature to second language learners?
3- Which literature text do we teach? How to choose the text?
4- Literature is so difficult, does the outcome deserve the huge efforts of teaching literature?
5- How could studying literature according to pragmatic theories change student's understanding of it?
6-What results do we expect to achieve?

The thesis aims to investigate the interactions of Hermetism and music in medieval Islamic philosophy, between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. The point of departure for this idea has been the works of Ikhwan al Safa, an esoteric group of philosophers from tenth-century Basra, who practiced alchemy and penned an encyclopedia, a chapter of which is devoted to the subject of music. Drawing on their familiarity with Greek philosophy, the cosmology of music they established showcases the influences of Pythagorean, Neoplatonist, as well as Hermetic teachings. Hermetism can be described as the tradition around the teachings attributed to the mythical figure of Hermes Trismegistus, and it has practical as much as intellectual significance in the late ancient and medieval world especially through its strong connection to magic, medicine, and most notably, alchemy. I am of the conviction that the fact that Ikhwan al Safa was practicing alchemy has greater influence on their philosophy of music then is previously given credit for. Some scholars like A. Affifi has pointed out that the importance of Hermetic influences in medieval Islamic philosophy has been understated, and I have observed that this is also the case in studies of medieval Islamic music philosophy.
Through formulating a clear working definition of Hermetism in terms of its occurrence in music
philosophy, I plan to carry out comparative textual analysis on music philosophical texts in Arabic written within between the ninth and thirteenth centuries, to see the nature and extent of possible Hermetic influences. I will also partly explore how we can contextualize Hermetic ideas in relation to the religion-political institutions and structures at the time.

In recent years, it has become apparent that authoritarian rule is reconfiguring when autocrats make extensive usage of digital technologies (e.g. Schlumberger et al. 2023). One important question is whether and how repression is changing its forms and/or intensity. However, just as repressive patterns vary across countries, the usage and effects of digital technologies are likely to vary as well, not least because the range of strategies – from extensive surveillance of the masses to disinformation campaigns to targeted hacking – is very large. Research on how and why digitally enabled repression varies is still in its infancy. Against this backdrop, this contribution presents results from an explorative study of three North African countries (Morocco, Algeria and Egypt) which are all characterized by persistent regimes, yet display some noteworthy differences in their security sectors as well as in their repressive infrastructures more broadly.
With the help of process tracing and qualitative content analysis, the study will shed light on the developments of repression in the context of digitization in recent years. Concrete hypotheses from the literature on digital authoritarianism and repression, for example on the impact of state capacity, international alliances and imports of surveillance technology, and legitimation strategies will be examined in order to advance theory-building on repressive patterns in the digital age.

The hydrocarbon wealth of some West Asian and North African (WANA) countries and their rentier economies long defined the perception of regime durability in the region. While the age of oil and gas is not over, the reality of the climate crisis hits a region deeply shaped by hydrocarbon revenues. Diversification strategies and adaptation to the region’s strong vulnerabilities to climate change effects come into the limelight of international political and scientific debates.
The kingdom of Morocco, with its minimal hydrocarbon resources, is a regional pioneer in embracing the shift to renewable energy resources and environmental preservation policy. Sustainability policies have become a significant feature of Moroccan foreign policies in the last years. Using an in-depth discourse analysis of the king’s speeches on matters of climate change, environmentalism, and sustainability since 2007 we retrace the regime’s attempts to make an international mark as a forerunner of sustainability.
The monarch’s speeches are quasi-binding policy guidelines for domestic players and frame important developments and shifts in Morocco’s foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis international partners. We highlight the use of sustainability as a tool of legitimation and international integration of an authoritarian regime and how related narratives change over time or become naturalized.

In authoritarian regimes, discourses have been studied mainly with respect to legitimation strategies. However, authoritarian government officials also talk about the repression their security agencies employ in the context of contentious politics. While some works have shed light on the framing by officials under authoritarianism, research has rarely investigated how these narratives are received by different audiences.
This paper brings together both the senders and the audiences of official discourses surrounding the protests of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Morocco in 2010-2011. It analyzes the speeches by high officials and how different audiences responded, differentiating between the domestic and international levels. The different responses towards the rhetoric strategies in the two countries also influenced the dynamics of protests leading to divergent outcomes, paving the way for the short-lived democratic transition in Tunisia, and autocratic regime renewal in Morocco.
This study employs a qualitative approach and is based on original fieldwork in Tunisia, Morocco, and Brussels, where we conducted interviews with, i.a., protest actors, civil society activists, journalists, academics, international donors, and other government officials. Moreover, we analyze documents, statements, media reports and contributions, as well as secondary literature. This paper represents the first work to dig into the meso-level of audiences of discourses aimed at justifying state repression, thereby contributing to literatures on comparative authoritarianism, political violence, and the international dimensions of external support for authoritarian governments. Using the pivotal case of the Arab uprisings, it adds another piece to the puzzle of support for authoritarian rule and furthers our understanding of state-society relations in Morocco and Tunisia more generally.

Introduced by French writer Renaud Camus in 2010 to defame non-white people, particularly those from Muslim-majority countries, narratives about a so-called “Great Replacement” have circulated in Tunisia for at least the past year. Tailoring the initial concept to regional contexts, the Tunisian discourse suggests that Sub-Saharan migrants aim to systematically alter Maghrebi societies. Political parties and public figures, notably the Tunisian Nationalist Party (TNP) and President Kais Saied, have propagated anti-Black, anti-migrant, and xenophobic narratives as part of their renewed authoritarian discourse. This discourse swiftly translated into the targeting of Sub-Saharan migrants and Black Tunisians, among others resulting in racially severe street violence. Simultaneously, migration attempts to Europe have surged.
How has conspiracy theory and discourse traveled across the Mediterranean? To what extent have Renaud Camus’s initial logics been adopted, and what elements have been altered? In addition to emphasizing transregional challenges such as political and social approaches to migration, these dynamics also bring to light identity issues and prompt questions about who is perceived to belong or not belong to society. While these questions were already pivotal in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, with debates centering on concepts like “Tunisianité,” they have regained significance in the recent re-autocratization.
Taking a problem-centered approach, this paper draws on studies of identity politics, conspiracy and radicalization, as well as the traveling of theory. Empirically, the paper relies on speeches and official statements issued by Kais Saied and the TNP, as well as works by Renaud Camus, which are examined through frame analysis. Building on these insights, along with press reports and secondary sources, the paper further explores the interrelations and overlaps between discourse and political practice. It draws first conclusions on the legitimizing functions of the Great Replacement discourse as a state-sponsored narrative and examines how discourse has manifested in practice.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of power in the Persian Gulf region within the context of US elections, employing the Rubik's Cube metaphor to capture the complexity of geopolitical shifts.
The Persian Gulf has emerged as the gravitational center of power in the region, marked by its abundant resources and strategic significance. Simultaneously, the 2024 US elections stand as a pivotal moment, poised to shape American foreign policy and global engagement for years to come. This research examines the symbiotic relationship between these two realms, elucidating the interplay of interests, alliances, and strategies in a transitioning world order. With a keen eye on the different powers interested in the region, it analyzes how the transfer of power in the Persian Gulf region intersects with the electoral dynamics in the United States, impacting the broader global landscape. By unraveling this intricate web of relationships, the paper provides insights into the implications of these developments for regional stability, international cooperation, and the balance of power.

Keywords: Persian Gulf, Geopolitics, US Elections, Foreign Policy

Bio
Corina Lozovan is a PhD candidate and researcher in Political Science and International Relations at the Institute for Political Studies at the Catholic University of Portugal. She holds a master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Lund University and postgraduate courses in Strategic and Security Studies. She focuses on the Middle East and Gulf region, where she is currently a Visiting Researcher at Sultan Qaboos University in Oman, working on her dissertation.

The United State's presidential election is one of the world's significant events. It is understood to have multi-layered impacts on various global dynamics. It sets the overall strategic direction for the United State (US), that prompts reactive and pre-emptive policy response, amongst the country's friends of foes globally. Against that backdrop, the events in the running months to the election, as well as the result, will be closely monitored from Tehran. It will influence various aspects of Iran's strategic response regionally and globally. Issues such as the future of the country's nuclear programme and the government's sanction circumvention efforts, Iran-China, and Iran-Russia ties, as well as the future of brewing tension between Iran and Israel will all be affected by two major questions; what the US administration under Biden will do during the rest of his presidency, and who will lead the next government. This US election is also of particular significance for Iran, as it may coincide with a change of the country's supreme leader. The internal conversation over potential candidate(s) and the timing of the transition is indeed unclear.
Nevertheless, given the senior age of Ayatollah Khamenei, it is not going to be a surprising political event for the elite in Iran. The domestic pollical dynamics in the country since the start of President Raisi's tenure have visibly shifted. The conservative government of Raisi has adopted a harsher narrative towards the US and its allies, sided with Russia in its aggression against Ukraine, and opened a new chapter in hostility towards Israel by directly attacking the country. The US presidential election result and the potential transition of power at the most senior office in Iran, are certainly going to affect Iran's existing strategies. This presentation will provide an all-encompassing analysis of the ways in which such strategies are likely formed by Tehran.

Keywords: Iran, Geopolitics, US Elections, Foreign Policy

Bio
Dr. Sara Bazoobandi is a Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Studies (IMES) at the
German Institute for Middle East Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, an Associate Fellow at the ISPI,
Milan, and a Non-resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf State Institute in Washington. She has written
extensively on Iranian foreign policy and society, most recently in Bazoobandi, S. "Populism,
Jihad, and Economic Resistance: Studying the Political Discourse of Iran's Supreme Leader"
Digest of the Middle East Studies, 2023, 1-19; and Bazoobandi, S. Jens Heibach, and Thomas
Richter, "Iran's Foreign Policy Making: Consensus Building or Power Struggle?" British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, 2023.

At Cairo University in June 2009, US president Barack Obama told millions of viewers that he
had come to the Middle East “to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims
around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” Ten years later, Mike
Pompeo, then Secretary of State of the Trump administration, travelled to Cairo and called
Obama’s ‘new beginning’ a ‘dire misjudgement,’ and promised a ‘real new beginning.’ Then,
when the Democrats moved back into the White House in January 2021, pundits in turn called for a ‘new beginning’ in the Biden administration.
From Washington, to Kennedy, to Biden, US presidents have promised change. Nowhere is this
more pronounced than in US foreign policy in the Middle East, which became a major region of
interest during the second quarter of the 20th century. Yet, while American voters are attuned to this discursive environment of change that is often in stark contrast with the structural and
institutional continuities that the US government is subjected to, the tension between US presidents’ words and deeds often raise high hopes and lead to bitter disappointments among
foreign audiences. In light of the 2024 presidential elections, this paper takes a look at how US
president have promise change in the country’s Middle East policy, and raises the hypothesis on the inevitability of practical shortcomings of such discursive interventions centred around the notion of presidential breaks.

The paper analyses the evolution of the Russian Federation's role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the corresponding changes in its foreign policy during the 20th and 21st centuries. It adheres to the strategic culture theory, employing a multidimensional power projection approach. The paper pays particular attention to the critical junctures in the history of engagement of the global powers with the MENA countries, including the interventions into regional conflicts, which contributed to the strategic reorientation of Russian foreign policy and partnership with regional actors. In this particular case, the continuities in Russia's strategic culture and a difference in the strategic approaches from those of the US became most evident in the Syrian campaign. The paper examines how Moscow's assertive and pragmatic foreign policy line has enabled Russia to re-engage with the region in an attempt to reshape the security architecture through the projection of power and the employment of determined strategies in alliance building.

Keywords: Russia Geopolitics, US Elections, Foreign Policy

Bio
Olena Osypenkova is a Doctoral Researcher at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), the Institute for Middle East Studies, and the University of Hamburg, Department of Global History. Her academic research interests encompass the subject of Russian foreign and security policy in the Middle East and North Africa. She was previously employed by the Diplomatic Mission of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Ukraine.

Die Herausbildung der maḏāhib (Rechtsschulen) stellt einen der wichtigsten Wendepunkte in
der islamischen Rechtsgeschichte dar, wodurch das islamische Recht schon im 4./10. Jahrhundert ein klar strukturiertes Rechtsschulwesen hatte. Die Lehren der einzelnen in sich abgegrenzten maḏāhib lagen jahrhundertelang den verschiedenen Aktivitäten der islamischen Jurisprudenz zugrunde, darunter der Erteilung von Rechtsgutachten und der Rechtsprechung. Hierbei bildet(e) der iǧtihād als Oberbegriff für die Methoden der Rechtsfindung, Normenfortbildung und die Anwendbarkeit des islamischen Rechts das bedeutendste Instrument, dessen Funktionalität die Qualität der Rechtsnormen und die Entwicklung der maḏhab-Ordnung bedingt.
Die Herausforderungen und Komplexität der Moderne provozierten um die Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert eine heftige Debatte über die Kompatibilität der maḏāhib und ihre Fähigkeit, auf die modernen gesellschaftlichen Anforderungen zu reagieren. In dieser Diskussion schwanken die Positionen muslimischer Gelehrten – deren Stellungnahmen mit ihrer Haltung gegenüber dem iǧtihād eng verbunden sind – zwischen Fortsetzung und Auflösung der existierenden maḏāhib.* Infolge dessen wurden sowohl die iǧtihād-Praxis als auch der Umgang mit den Lehren der Rechtsschulen einem Wandel unterworfen, der sich insbesondere in den in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts gegründeten Fiqh-Institutionen – wie der Akademie für die islamischen Studien der Azhar (1961), der islamischen Fiqh-Akademie der islamischen Weltliga (1978) und der internationalen Rechtsakademie der Organisation für die islamische Zusammenarbeit (1981) – niederschlägt.
Federführend für den geplanten Vortrag sind die Fragen nach der Kontinuität und dem Wandel der Lehren der traditionellen Rechtsschulen infolge der maḏāhib-Debatte sowie danach, welche Rolle diese in gegenwärtigen Fiqh-Institutionen spielen. Hinzu kommt die Frage nach den veränderten Merkmalen der von modernen Rechtsakademien entwickelten Jurisprudenz in Verbindung mit der kollektiven iǧtihād-Praxis. Diese Charakteristika sollen anhand von Beispielen für Resolutionen dieser Akademien vor Augen geführt werden.

Die modernen islamischen Denker etablierten eine neue Ideologie und generierten ein Verständnis der religiösen Texte, das vom klassischen unterscheidet. Der Mensch und seine Interessen stehen nicht mehr im Zentrum der Forschung. Dies stieß einen großen Wandel in der Wahrnehmung der religiösen Texte an. Dazu äußerte sich u.a. Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zaid (gest. 2010) „Wenn das religiöse Denken den Texten Sprecher -Gott- zum Zentrum der Beschäftigung und Interessenschwerpunkt machte, setzen wir den Empfänger -der Mensch- mit seiner ganzen sozialen und historischen Wirklichkeit, die ihn umgeben, in den Mittelpunkt und nehmen ihn zum Ausgangs- und Endpunkt."*
Die klassischen Methoden wurden intensiv kritisiert und es wurde dazu aufgefordert, das klassische Erbe weiterzuentwickeln. Dies wirft mehrere Fragen auf: wie gestaltete sich dieser Wandlungsprozess und inwiefern beeinflussten die klassischen Methoden der Rechtsquellen und des islamischen Rechts die modernen islamischen Denker? Berührt die Abkehr vom Menschen im Zentrum auch den fiqh (das islamische Recht) oder nur die Theologie? Beinhaltet nicht das Konzept al-maṣlaḥa (Allgemeinwohl) im uṣūl al-fiqh (Rechtsquellen) die Beschäftigung mit dem Menschen, oder ist diese Ansicht auf die modernen islamischen Denker beschränkt? Betrifft der Wandel die Rechtsquellen oder die Rechtwissenschaft und welche Auswirkungen hat dieser auf die aḥkām (die Urteile)?
Anhand der Schriften der einflussreichen Denker, wie Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zaid, der die Hauptquellen des islamischen Rechts und die Methodologie von Muḥammad ibn Idrīs aš-Šāfiʿī (gest. 820) diskutierte, Muḥammad Šaḥrūr (gest. 2019), der danach strebte, eine neue Grundlage des islamischen Rechts zu errichten und Muḥammad Abū al-Qāsim Ḥāǧ Ḥamad (gest. 2004), der das Familienrecht und die Gesetze im Islam mit seiner modernen Ideologie und seinem spezifischem Verständnis von iǧtihād (eigenständige Urteilsbildung) usw. behandelte, werden diese Fragen geklärt und durch Beispiele verdeutlicht, wie sich dieser Wandel im islamischen Recht bei den modernen islamischen Denkern gestaltete.

* Naṣr Ḥamid Abū Zaid, Naqd al-ḫiṭāb ad-dīnī, 3. Aufl. (ad-Dār al-bayḍāʾ u.a.: al-Markaz aṯ-ṯaqāfī al-ʿarabī, 2007), 200–201.–201.

Die intensive und vielfältige iǧtihād-Praxis in der formativen Phase des Islam führte, insbesondere zwischen dem 8. und dem 9. Jahrhundert n. Chr., zur Entfaltung des islamischen Rechts- und Normensystems und zur Herausbildung unterschiedlicher Rechtsschulen. Von den in dieser Zeit zahlreich entstandenen Autoritäten konnten nur wenige ihr Fortbestehen sichern. Diese sind die hanafitische, die malikitische, die schafiitische und die hanbalitische Rechtsschule. Sie verbreiteten sich in unterschiedlichen Regionen – freilich bis heute ohne strikte Trennung.* Autorität erlangte man auf der Grundlage der fachlichen Kompetenz und der Fähigkeit, unbeschränkten iǧtihād zu praktizieren. So schreibt bspw. Makdisi: „The criterion of
leadership was universal acceptance of the one with the greatest knowledge of Islamic law.“**
Zu der Frage, wie relevant die Rechtsschultradition für muslimische Gläubige im Migrationskontext (hier: Deutschland) ist und inwieweit die Vorstellung der Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Rechtsschule eine Rolle in ihrem Alltag bei der Fatwa-Suche spielt, gibt es kaum empirische Erkenntnisse. Diese Frage wird im Rahmen des geplanten Vortrages auf der Basis der bislang erhobenen Daten meines laufenden Habilitationsprojektes behandelt. Das durchgeführte Sample umfasst 46 semistrukturierte Interviews mit sunnitischen Muslim:innen in Deutschland. Dem Sample liegen drei Teilgruppen zugrunde: Muslimische Migrant:innen (mit eigener Migrationserfahrung), Muslim:innen mit Migrationshintergrund in zweiter Generation und deutsche Konvertit:innen. Die Auswertung der Daten beruht auf einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse und orientiert sich an der Grounded-Theory-Methodologie (GTM).

* Neben diesen sunnitischen Rechtsschulen sind auch schiitische Rechtsschulen entstanden wie die Zaiditen, die Zwölfer Schia und die Ismailiten. Sie gelten als eigenständige Rechtsschulen.
** Makdisi, George: „The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious History“, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, (1979), 10, S. 1–8, hier S. 6; ähnlich Hallaq, Wael B.: The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, S. 163f., 168f.

Historians have debated whether the Ottoman Empire treated its distant regions as colonies or
protected territories as for the second half of the nineteenth century. This debate has primarily
focused on political and economic aspects, overlooking the perceptions and relationships of
individuals of the Ottoman capital and its peripheries. Nevertheless individuals moved, encountered each other and formed links. One of the ways rendering movement of people was historical slave trade, which enabled some affluent residents of Constantinople to possess slave children, predominantly with Caucasian and African heritage in the late nineteenth century. Their memoirs provide trajectories on enslaved children; their first encounter, their enslavement experience, their agency, and their relationship with their owner(s). These nuanced narratives also reveal some elements of racial prejudices from both sides, as well as aspects of Ottoman
orientalism.
This paper aims to portray forms of child enslavement in the affluent households of the late 19th century in the age of abolition, illuminating the often overlooked narratives of marginalized individuals in Ottoman history. Furthermore, it endeavors to discuss what slave children’s lives tell us about Ottoman orientalism and racism in a broader context. Employing a narratological approach, my paper seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding by contextualizing the text, the author, and children’s enslavement experiences.

Key words: Ottoman Empire, Children, Constantinople, Race and Slavery, Orientalism, Ego
Documents

While the precolonial states of the Middle East often employed decentralisation in its various forms – territorial and non-territorial, formal and informal, as well as the resulting legal pluralism, their modern counterparts are largely centralised, not counting exceptions such as Iraq. Political decentralisation (including autonomy or federalism) is often a change externally imposed by rebels or foreign powers and is presented as Western innovation. This paper aims to explore the reasons for this new perspective on decentralisation, including the particular times when the modern Middle Eastern states were born, the concerns of the ruling elites, and the geopolitical situation. At the same time, it asks how this approach could be changed to allow for a more meritbased evaluation of decentralisation. The author hypothesizes that, while the push for centralisation is a product of the specific conditions of the interwar period perpetuated by the elite’s self-interest, it could be changed by proper historical education. The research involves the analysis of historical sources, historical narratives, and foundation myths, as well as the theories of legitimacy. While it aims to question these matters on the regional level, the examples of Turkey and Iraq will be used prominently for evidence.

Keywords: political decentralisation, decentralisation, legitimacy, Middle Eastern states, Middle
East

At the Beginning of the 20th century the young Shi’ite scholar Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn, alerted by the spread of missionary polemics against Islam and the dissemination of Western science in late nineteenth century by the associates of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, wrote a book titled al-Dīn wa al-islām aw al-DaꜤwa al-islāmīya in 1912. He gave a copy to Amin al-Rihani, asking him for his comments. The ensuing correspondence between the two, to which Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn chiefly contributed, was subsequently published in two-volumes titled al-MurājaꜤāt al-rīḥānīya. In this paper I shall give an overview of this debate.

Individual preferences, such as attitudes toward risk and patience, are crucial factors in shaping
socioeconomic and political decision-making. Given the centrality of preferences in economic
theory, various studies have focused on explaining the cross-country variation in preferences
worldwide. In this study, we examine the role of a country's dependency on oil rents and its
influence on individual preferences, particularly with respect to patience and risk-taking. We
contribute to the resource curse hypothesis, which suggests that in the long term, resource
(especially oil) dependent economies grow less than resource-poor countries. We shed light on
a rather neglected aspect of the resource curse: the distortions of individual preferences. To
capture time and risk preferences, we use data from the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an
experimentally validated survey dataset of 80,000 people in 76 countries, which measures
preferences in a nationally representative sample. We examine the effect of oil rent dependency
on these preferences across countries. Our results show that societies with higher dependency
on oil rents exhibit lower levels of patience and higher preferences for taking risks. Moreover,
we demonstrate that an important channel through which oil rents affect patience is corruption.
Oil rents increase the risk of corruption, which in turn shortens individuals' time horizons by
increasing economic and political uncertainties. A rent-seeking society is shortsighted in its
decision-making and, thus, less patient. Distortions generated by the inflow of oil rents may
also create attractive rent-seeking opportunities and increase preferences for taking higher risks
to capture these rents.
Keywords: preferences; oil rents; resource curse; patience; risk; cross-country

The role of the web in the precarization of female migrant workers is rarely discussed, and even less so in the Gulf countries. While the connective nature of mobility has reached consensus in the social sciences since the advent of new communication media, debates continue about the impact of the web on precarious migrant communities. Such is the case of a growing number of foreign women employed as domestic workers in the Gulf, who use the video-sharing application TikTok to voice their protests against their working conditions. As a result of the kafala system (sponsorship) which places them under the employer’s authority, their living conditions and ability to express themselves are restricted. The resulting abuses are proportionally rooted in migration systems and labor laws that include, among other things the prohibition from resigning without the employer’s consent, making it illegal to abandon their posts. Governments and diplomatic representatives justify their non-interventionist stance on the grounds that it is impossible to interfere in employers’ privacy, realities that are being challenged by the emergence of digital practices.
The particularity of these TikTok videos lies in their protest aspect, particularly when they challenge the stereotypes that these women are associated to. What they share on TikTok spans entertaining content to calls for help, sometimes in very creative ways. These videos are being denounced by diplomatic representatives, the local media and authorities, and several cases of imprisonment have already been recorded. Therefore, this phenomenon sheds light on new forms of body reappropriation, but also invites to understand the emergence of new forms of web-based surveillance. This paper is based on qualitative analysis of online content collected in 2021-2023, ethnographic fieldwork and 20 interviews conducted in Kuwait in 2022-2023 thanks to my integration into a local organization for the protection of housemaids.

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Previous research in foreign policy analysis has documented the increasing number of actors involved and the significant role of identity in shaping the preferences and behaviors of non-state actors. However, this study addresses a gap in the literature by incorporating sectarian groups into foreign policy studies, particularly in countries where society is deeply divided along sectarian lines. It examines how sectarian identities influence the definition of self and other, as well as ally and enemy, in weak states. Through a comparative analysis of major Lebanese sectarian groups in two case studies—the July War of 2006 and the Syrian Civil War—this paper investigates the role of sectarian identity in the interest-building processes at the sub-state level and their behavioral patterns in foreign policy making. Unlike other non-state actors, institutionalized sectarian groups in deeply divided societies pose an existential challenge to core state functions, especially as state authority weakens and sectarian identities gain prominence. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Lebanon and interviews with leaders of major sects, this research argues that a comprehensive study of foreign policy requires a deeper understanding of the complex interplay and network of relations among sectarian groups. It proposes a three-part categorization for the behavioral patterns of sectarian groups as foreign policy actors: exerting pressure on the government, being embedded within the state, and functioning as quasi-states. In conclusion, it is important and timely discussion to understand and frame behavioral patterns of sectarian groups in foreign policy making in Lebanon as sectarian identities come to seem permanent in the Middle East and more countries in the region like Iraq, Syria and Yemen starting to look like Lebanon.
Keywords: Foreign policy analysis, Actors, Identity, Sectarian groups, Lebanon.

Der Beitrag basiert auf durchgeführten Studien zu Islam- und Muslimfeindlichkeit in aktuellen deutschen Bildungsmedien (Curricula, Schulbücher und Unterrichtshilfen) aller Bundesländer und fokussiert Aushandlungsprozesse gesellschaftlicher Zugehörigkeit von muslimisch markierten Personen zur unmarkierten deutschen Dominanzkultur. Die Untersuchungen der ausgewählten Bildungsmedien zeigen, wie Repräsentationsmodalitäten von Muslim*innen oftmals jene Aushandlungsfunktion übernehmen, anstatt gesellschaftliche Realitäten, muslimisches oder schulisches Alltagsleben zu thematisieren. Dabei dienen diskursive Strategien und Praktiken der Veranderung, Verfremdung oder monothematischen Fokussierung dazu, ‚muslimisch Andere‘ als für den gesellschaftlichen (oder schulischen) Frieden und Alltag disruptive Elemente herauszustellen. Die Studien konnten dementsprechend aufzeigen, dass aktuelle Bildungsmedien Muslim*innen vorwiegend als problem- und krisenzentriert sowie im Kontext von Versicherheitlichung, Migration und Menschenrechtsfragen aufgreifen. Auch die einseitige Thematisierung der Kreuzzüge in einigen Geschichtsschulbüchern bietet Potenzial für die exkludierende Erzählung historischer Antagonismen zwischen (christlich geprägtem) Europa und (muslimisch geprägter) WANA-Region, die auf diese Weise kulturalistische Stereotype (re )konstruiert. Über in Schulbüchern abgedruckte Zeitungsartikel oder politische Karikaturen forcieren nachrichtenmediale Diskurse die Exklusion von Muslim*innen und finden unreflektiert Eingang in den gesellschaftlich hochrelevanten Wissensbestand, der für kommende Generationen bildungsmedial aufbereitet wird.

Schulbuchstudien zu aktuellen deutschen Politikschulbüchern zeigen unterschiedliche Auseinandersetzungen in der Darstellung von Islam und Muslim:innen (Shalaby und Spielhaus 2023). Insbesondere im Kontext von politisch und religiös motiviertem Extremismus lassen sich zwei Modi der Bedrohung oder des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts unterscheiden (Düsterhöft et al. 2023). Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt zwei exemplarische Schulbuchdoppelseiten in den Mittelpunkt und vergleicht sie in Hinblick auf ihre Thematisierung von (islamistischem) Extremismus. Beiden ausgewählten Beispielen ist zwar die Bedrohung thematischbedingt – eben durch die Thematisierung von politischem Extremismus – vorgegeben. Dennoch wird die Bedrohung in beiden Fällen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen akzentuiert. Der Beitrag schlägt eine mehrdimensionale Inhaltsanalyse vor, um die sprachlichen Elemente, die Perspektivität und Intermedialität der verwendeten Quellen sowie die Text-Bild-Beziehungen (Aamotsbakken 2014; Dreesen 2015) einzeln und multimodal in ihrem Zusammenspiel in den Blick zu nehmen. In einer kontrastierenden Gegenüberstellung zielt die Analyse darauf ab, die Schulbuchdoppelseiten zu (islamistischem) Extremismus zu vergleichen und diese in einen Modus der Bedrohung oder im Rahmen einer Handlungskompetenz einzuordnen. Somit stellt der Beitrag die Zielsetzung der Politikunterrichtseinheit infrage und trägt in Hinblick auf vorherige Studien zur Prävention von gewalttätigem Extremismus durch Bildung (Christodoulou und Szakács 2018) zu einer didaktischen Debatte bei.
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Christodoulou, Eleni und Simona Szakács. 2018. Prävention von gewalttätigem Extremismus durch Bildung: Internationale und deutsche Ansätze, Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert-Institut.
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Dieser Beitrag basiert auf der qualitativen Analyse von zwanzig aktuellen deutschen Schulbüchern für politische Bildung im Hinblick auf geschlechtsspezifische Darstellungen im Kontext des Islams. Er behandelt die Fragen: Wer wird in Schulbucheinheiten, die den Islam oder Muslime erwähnen, mit welchen Tätigkeiten oder Handlungen in Verbindung gebracht? Wer/was bleibt unthematisiert ("unmarkiert"), und wer bzw. was wird thematisiert? Wird Weiblichkeit in Bezug auf den Islam thematisiert, nicht aber Maskulinität? Werden Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit auch in Bezug auf den Atheismus oder das Christentum thematisiert?
Besonders interessant sind dabei fiktive Figuren mit Namen wie Ayşe oder Mehmet, die zur Darstellung von Lerninhalten oder zur Erklärung des Islams genutzt werden. Schulbücher konstruieren fiktive Charaktere mit türkischen oder arabischen Namen und markieren Unterschiede entlang der Kategorien Islam, Herkunft und Geschlecht. Immer wieder gelingt es ihnen, in Bildern, Aufgaben und Texten Muslime als unangefochtenen Teil des Klassenzimmers darzustellen. In visuellen Darstellungen sind Frauen mit Kopftuch die am häufigsten dargestellten Musliminnen. Fotos, Grafiken oder Karikaturen zeigen deutlich häufiger als Männer als Muslime gekennzeichnete Frauen. Muslimisch gezeichnete Männer. Die Schulbücher geben oft keine Auskunft über den Kontext des Bildes und die dargestellten Aktivitäten. Das Kopftuch steht dann als symbolisches Bild für den Islam oder religiöse Vielfalt (visiotype), insbesondere wenn kein Text-Bild-Bezug erkennbar ist. Während die meisten Muslime auf Bildern weiblich sind, sind die meisten der namentlich genannten muslimischen Akteure männlich. In Schulbüchern werden Persönlichkeiten wie Staatsmänner, Sportler und Terroristen namentlich erwähnt, während muslimische Frauen nur selten namentlich erwähnt werden oder als Akteure im Text erscheinen. In dem Beitrag wird daher erörtert, wie sich implizite und explizite Botschaften zueinander verhalten und welches Verständnis des Verhältnisses zwischen Religionen und Staat sie vermitteln.

My contribution explores the politics of emotions under the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) in Turkey, and the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a right wing populist leader. I cover the period after 2002 when the party swept to national power. I examine how emotional politics, and particularly the use of neo-Ottomanist narratives to create a new national mood, contributed to the durability of Erdoğan’s rule. I analyse the interactions between national narratives, symbolic politics and politics of emotions, and argue that these interactions are the basis of the popular support the AKP and Erdoğan have enjoyed over two decades.
I analyse three symbolic sites of the Neo-Ottomanist politics of emotions by applying narrative
analysis: leader, space and myth. I initially analyse Erdoğan as a leader who embodies the historical emotional archive and the evolution of Islamic tradition in Turkey, from victimhood to a sense of omni-potence. I trace the main emotional traits of Erdoğan’s cult of leadership: humiliation, envy, disgust, hatred, anxiety, anger and resentment, which together construct the basis of Neo-Ottomanist national narrative. I then examine Istanbul as a symbolic space of Neo-Ottomanist nostalgia and imperial greed through the Islamic tradition’s emotional investment in the city,
analysing the symbolic political actions and both the performative and the actual operations of the AKP in the city. Lastly I discuss the urge to construct a national myth by mythologizing the 15 July 2016 coup attempt and ascribing its failure to the struggle of AKP supporters. Through this heroic discourse of resistance, the AKP has endeavoured to construct a new pathos of national narcissism, which I show relates to the emotional implications of the Neo-Ottomanist discourse to the nation.
Yet, by constructing the nation through dichotomies (us/them, heroes/traitors, patriots/terrorists)
after the coup attempt, the AKP has failed to extend its omnipotence nationwide. Thus, I argue that the Neo-Ottomanist national narrative, and the politics of emotions around it, have played a
remarkable role in the AKP’s enduring power. Yet, considering the increasingly populist-authoritarian rule of Erdoğan, and the growing polarization in the country that followed the coup attempt, I argue that the Neo-Ottomanist narrative and emotions it evokes have been losing appeal.
Keywords: Neo-Ottomanism, politics of emotions, Erdoğan, Turkey
Nagehan Tokdoğan
Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Center for the History of Emotion

A new capital fraction that emerged within the capitalist sector in Turkey during the internationalization of capital has today become an influential actor in the transformation of the political regime and, thus, in the change of social power relations. As Islamic capitalists became significant actors in society, establishing cultural hegemony against the big bourgeoisie has been a pivotal goal in shaping the "new Turkey". In this context, understanding how the rise of Islamic
capital has turned into a critique of the Kemalist modernization project and how capital accumulation has allowed for a new cultural strategy incorporating Islamic tenets will enable us to make interpretations relevant to the present day. This paper discusses the dynamics behind the fact that despite the AKP's aim to build cultural hegemony and its neo-Ottomanism theses, and its glorification of classical Ottoman mosques in this context, some Islamic capitalists who have risen under AKP rule desire the mosques they build to be modern/VIP mosques.
At this point, the study will address who the Islamic capitalists are and where they historically position themselves within the dominant class relations. Then, it will delve into the struggle of Islamic capital, which has become a new power bloc with state support during the AKP period, against Kemalist modernization, as well as its internal cultural contradictions. Based on the findings of the ethnographic fieldwork conducted for a year and a half in Sancaklar Mosque, 15 July Martyrs Mosque, Şakirin Mosque and Yeşilvadi Mosque in Istanbul, the motivations of the Islamic capitalists who are the founders of these mosques in building modern/VIP mosques will be revealed and what this means in their hegemonic cultural struggles will be evaluated.

Codification studies, which constitute an important place in the history of law, are one of the most important discussions of deep change in societies. It is possible to define codification in the narrow sense as law-making and in the broad sense as a regulation valid in the whole country by putting the scattered traditional law in writing. There are debates on codification in terms of whether it is oral or written, its formal characteristics, and its sphere of influence. In the world legal culture, it is not possible to start codification studies from a specific date in temporal terms. In this study, based on the concepts of codification, we first tried to examine the national codification movements in the Ottoman Empire in the modern period and then the legal studies carried out in Egypt and Iraq under the leadership of Abdurrazzâq Ahmad al-Sanhûrî. The Ottoman scholar Ahmad Jawdat Pasha shares same idea with the German jurist Savigny, particularly Savigny’s view that the source of law lies in the legal consciousness of the people, and that the foundations of legal rules should stem from the customs and traditions of the populace. According to Jawdat Pasha, codification should be shaped by the needs, customs, and national traditions of the people. Adopting laws created for another country's specific societal context would not only be impractical and inapplicable but also inappropriate. In line with this philosophy, Ahmad Jawdat Pasha made significant efforts during his time, and with the support of certain factions, he succeeded in compiling a legal code based on Islamic jurisprudence. This code, known as the Majalla, was designed specifically to address issues related to transactions (mu'amalat). Since the Middle Eastern countries were under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire for a long time, the national legalization activities in the Ottoman Empire will be discussed first. After mentioning the life, works, teachers and students of Sanhūrī, the main basis of our study, a brief political history about this region will be given before moving on to Sanhūrī's Egyptian and Iraqi law studies. The legalization movements in these two countries will also be briefly touched upon. In these activities, the laws prepared by Sanhūrī will be analyzed and compared.
Key Concepts: Taqnīn (legislation), Tadwīn (codification), Iqtibas (quotation), Sanhūrī, Wasīṭ fī sharḥi al-ḳānūni al-madaniyyi al-jadīd

Following Rouhani's second term and the nuclear deal's breakdown, Iran has seen a dramatic change in the political landscape with the rise of conservatives. Since the last presidential and legislative elections, conservatives have become increasingly powerful and have marginalized
reformist and moderate groups. This change has deepened the rift between the state and society, which is shown in record low voter turnout rates. The economic crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, and Mahsa Amini protests have all contributed to this divide.
Amidst this political evolution, the emergence of the ultra-conservative Peydari Front has reshaped Iran's trajectory, both domestically and internationally. This group has propelled Iran towards a more hardline stance, amplifying militarized rhetoric and entrenching its influence on foreign policy. The recent escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has provided Tehran with an opportunity to assert its regional dominance, exemplified by its unprecedented direct confrontation with Israel and heightened nuclear ambitions.
This research explores the complex processes behind Iran's shift to conservatism and examines the implications for both domestic policy and foreign policy. Its investigation centers on how the rise of the Peydari Front has altered Iran's political environment by reaffirming the supremacy of conservative elites and military bureaucracy over popular opinion. It suggests that in the face of a crisis of legitimacy in the state-society dynamic, this move towards aggressive policies, especially in foreign affairs, acts as a vehicle for ideological consolidation.
This study tries to shed light on the intricate relationship between ideology, governance, and international relations in contemporary Iran by examining the interaction between conservative
ascendancy and the country's changing geopolitical posture.

In the first half of the 19th century, the South Asian Khoja community still represented a
trading caste with its own distinct religious tradition, which was known as the satpanth
(“True Path”) and exhibited Islamic as well as Hindu influences. By the end of the century, the
great majority of Khojas identified themselves as followers of the Aga Khan and Ismaili Shia
Muslims. A small segment of the community had, however, broken away, identifying
themselves as Twelver Shias and as followers of legal authorities in the Iraqi shrine cities.
Since their first encounter with Twelver Shia sources of emulation (sg. marjaˁ) in the 1870s,
this relationship has gradually intensified. Today, the Twelver Shia Khojas number roughly
135.000 people, who are dispersed over five continents and organized in the democratically
based World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Muslim Communities, which is
headquartered in London. Despite the small size of the community, it wields
disproportionate influence within global Shia Islam. Thus, it has played a role in the rise of
Ayatullah Ali al-Sistani to become the chief religious authority in Najaf in the 1990s. Since
then, the World Federation has officially followed his rulings and has legitimized many of its
internal and external policies with reference to them. The present contribution scrutinizes
the relationship between the World Federation and its marjaˁ by analyzing internal
documents of the World Federation and legal rulings issued by Ali al-Sistani in response to
questions submitted by the organization, including issues as diverse as COVID19 vaccinations,
intra-marital discord and the calculation of religious dues in tune with the present highly
diversified field of global finance.

Iran, a pivotal player in the Middle East, stands as a nation of intricate paradoxes—a Persian state surrounded by non-Persian powers. Its foreign policy trajectory within the region has long been a subject of contention and scrutiny. This study embarks on an exploration and analysis of Iran's quest to enhance its regional influence, despite of its deep domestic challenges, following the Arab uprisings of 2011.
While Western and regional perspectives often portray Iran's foreign policy as aggressive, geared toward bolstering its ‘relative power’ in the Middle East, this study presents an alternative view. It argues that Iran's overarching objectives are more 'defensive', aimed at fortifying its ‘relative security’. The argument's logic primarily lies in the various factors, including Iran's inherent power structure, political dynamics, geopolitical positioning, and its cultural geography. The elements that are significantly raised by various geopolitical shifts especially after the Arab uprisings. Therefore, central to this study is the question of ‘What motivates Iran to seek an expanded political role and influence in the Middle East following the Arab uprisings?’
On this basis and drawing on theories of offensive and defensive realism, two primary approaches within Iran's foreign policy of "offensive approach" and the strategy of "coalition-building and alliances will be scrutinized. The approaches that encompass a spectrum of actions from expansionist strategies to opportunistic tactics and occasional ideological pursuits including supporting proxy militias, pursuing nuclear ambitions.
The paper concludes that how through a delicate balancing between geopolitics and ideology, Iran's foreign policy prioritize national security and strategic interests. It navigates regional complexities to bolster its influence and achieve ‘relative security’ by enhancing its ‘relative power’.

Key Words: Iran’s foreign policy, Arab Uprisings, Geopolitics, Relative Power, Relative
Security, Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism

Among the various aspects of Muslim cultures, its spiritual facet—particularly the one represented by and institutionalized through Sufism—provides a notable example of cultural transfer between the Islamic(ate) world and the West. Known primarily as tasawwuf in Sunni Islam or 'irfan in a Shiite context, Sufism initially entered Western consciousness by means of literature and later expanded its domain and intensified its visibility through living praxis. From its inception in the Occident in the late eighteenth century, the Sufi tradition became the subject of novel reformulation by Orientalists and colonial officers, who created a specific concept of “Sufi-ism” aligned with “mysticism”—a notion itself a modern construct created after the transformation of the adjective “mystique” into the substantive “la mystique” in the French language. Through this reformulation, mysticism served as the discursive context and semantic framework for Sufism, with the denotations and connotations of the former transferred to and ascribed to the latter. This lecture argues that such reframing of Oriental tasawwuf—which involved its dichotomization into “beautiful” and “ugly” sides by Westerners—indicates a tendency among them to associate Sufism with specific elements of their own modern “Self,” rather than rejecting it as merely a component of the Oriental Other. It emphasizes that Western involvement with mystical Islam cannot be reduced to a simple projection of Occidental conventional images onto Oriental subjects. Instead, attempts at the conceptual “purification” of Islamic spirituality eventually resulted in the naturalization and inculturation of Sufism within the Western context. Therefore, the EuroAmerican encounter with Sufism before the mid-twentieth century, inspired by what Rana Kabbani considers as “a commonplace of Orientalism that the West knows more about the East than the East knows about itself,” included not only the translation of selected Sufi texts but also, on a deeper level, the transformation and transition of Sufism itself.

In their Islam in Europe: Public Spaces and Civic Networks, Spyros Sofos and Roza Tsagarousianou distinguish between: "Islam as a religion and Islam as a political identity that can sustain forms of political action and protest against discrimination" (2013, p. 125).
Adopting a positivistic social science approach, the proposed presentation adopts Ramadan among students who registered the UGEMA, Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens as a “case study” to test this distinction. Primary sources to be consulted in this work include documentary evidence in the custody of the Archives nationales de France (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine) and Cité des mémoires étudiantes, Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur les mouvements étudiants; interviews Clement Moore recorded (2009); and participants’ published memoirs and works including La gangrène (1959). This research updates Alain Monchablon, Histoire de l'UNEF de 1956 à 1968 (1984) and Guy Pervillé, Les Étudiants algériens de l'université française: 1880-1962 : Populisme et nationalisme chez les étudiants et intellectuels musulmans algériens de française (1986) in the light of Patric Ferté and Caroline Barrera, Étudiants de l'exil · Migrations internationales et universités refuges (2020) and Sylvie Thénault, Les ratonnades d'Alger, 1956: Une histoire du racisme colonial (2022).

Questions of, and the perception of Islam and Muslims in media and political debates as well as extremism and radicalization.

ABSTRACT:
The arrival and development of the Hijazi Naqshbandi Sufi Community represents one of the unique stories of Muslims in Europe, highlighting religious policy, legal recognition, self-organization and selfpositioning of Muslims as well as the development of a European Islam and an Islamic theology in Europe.
Founded by Pakistani Islamic scholar and Sufi master, Shaykh Abdul Wahab Siddiqi (1942–1994), Hijaz College opened its doors in 1972. The Shaykh went on to become a significant public figure, establishing projects that lay the foundations for greater Muslim involvement in public affairs during the nascent socio-political development of Muslims in Europe, such as the Muslim Parliament. The Shaykh is interred in Europe’s only mausoleum and was the subject of a unique exhibition, drawing parallels with the historic reinterment of King Richard III.
The Shaykh’s heir, Shaykh Faiz Al Aqtab Siddiqi, re-established Hijaz College as a community trust focusing on outreach, community building, and mediation. Despite experiencing racism and rejudice, he established the Western world’s first official Sharia court where parties are bound by English law. He also founded Global Civility (globalcivility.com), proposing Civility as a cornerstone for social interaction, and HijazExpo (hijazexpo.com/), where visitors can tour an Islamic mausoleum. Last year, Global Civility helped facilitate the COP27 gathering of world religious leaders, hosted by Archbishop Williams, to address climate change. The Shaykh’s philanthropic, educational, and community activities continue to have considerable impact.
The presentation will provide an overview of the Community, their development, challenges faced, and current activities, a brief history of the College as one of Europe’s first Muslim seminaries, and a discussion of the projects that have left an important blueprint for Muslim engagement and presence in Europe since the 1970s, with overviews of key initiatives such as Global Civility, community outreach (especially during Covid), and the reinterment exhibition (https://www.bosworthbattlefield.org.uk/events/a-tale-of-two-reinterments-exhibition).

Presenter: Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi, esq.
Senior Advisor to HE Murshid Shaykh Faiz Al Aqtab Siddiqi